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CHAPTER I
CONCEPTS AND ACTIONS THROUGH 1942
Introduction
In the days since 1945, many people in the United States and
throughout · the Western world have doubted the efficacy of the United
Nations as a world organization to keep the peace .

Many questions have

been asked over and over again by the people in these countries.

Why

doesn't the United Nations expel the Soviets when they seem to be the
main trouble makers in the world?

Why did the United States join the

United Nations in the first place when it was known there would be no
resolution of the power politics question?

Why did the United States

join the United Nations when its own security would have been better
served if it had kept its traditional policy of isolationism?

Why

were the veto and unanimity clauses included in the Charter when it
could be seen that these clauses, in effect, would halt action on the
part of the United Nations?
The people have asked these questions in all sincerity and ,
in the light of recent events, it might seem that their views are the
correct ones.

It is necessary, therefore, to make an analysis of the

fundamental reasons why the United States j oined the United Nations at
all , or in joining the organization, why the United States did not
make it stronger than it is.

In making such an analysis we must look

at the fundamental viewpoints of the two great powers in the world

1

2

today.

We must examine their concepts o

a world organization.

He

must see exactly how much of their national sovereignty they were willing to sacrifice.

As the question of hovr much sovereignty was to be

given up revolved around the question of great povrer unanimity and
the veto, it is necessary to scrutinize the Russian and American attitudes which lay behind the inclusion of these two principles in the
United Nations Charter.
In makin

such an analysis, it is necessary to go back into

history, to see why the Russians and Americans arrived at certain
conclusions and principles contained in the United Nations Charter .
Such an examination of history will lead to the conclusion that all
nations are primarily concerned with the problem of security .

In

trying to obtain the best security it follows from necessity that each
nation must first of all be concerned vri th its own national security .
Because of this primary concern, nations are forced to play power
politics .
Cordell Hull once made a statement to this effect :
. . . , our fundamental national interests are - as they
always have been - the assuring of our national security
and the fostering of the economic and social •rell-being of
our people . To maintain these interests, our foreign
policy must necessarily deal ,.,i th current conditions and
must plan for the future in the light of concepts and
beliefs which •re as a nation accept for oursllves as the
guiding lines of our international behavior .
As long as we live in a world of international anarchy , all
nations are afraid to let go of their foothold on national security

(Boston:

lLouise W. Holborn, War and Peace Aims of the United Nations
Horld Peace Foundation, 1948), II , p . 237 .

3
until they are assured of international security.2
leads to the playing of power politics .

This , of course,

Some people say when speaking

of power politics that it fosters international anarchy.

When speaking

of their ovm nation's policies, however, these people would say that
power politics is synonymous with national defense.3

Power politics,

in the strict sense, however, does not necessarily imply the misuse of
power.
With such definitions in mind, we can study the foreign
policies of the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of
the first world war to the end of the second world war and see how the
retreat from isolationism on the part of both of these countries was,
in reality, a search for greater national security .
Post - Horld War I Concepts and Attitudes
of Soviet Russia
Concepts and attitudes in the Twenties and early Thirties . -Russia emerged from the first world vTar with the idea that her national
interests could be better served by pursuing a policy of withdrawal
from the affairs of Europe .

Russian leaders arrived at this conclusion

because nothing was gained from Russia 's participation in the war.
Soviet leaders, after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, concluded that
the war had only furthered the interests of the capitalistic nations,

2
vera 1icheles Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace (New York :
Whittlesey House, 1946), p . xiii .
3Frederick Schuman, "Regionalis:rrl and the Spheres of Influence",
Peace, Security, and the United Nations, Hans Mor enthau, ed . (Chica o,
University of Chicago Press, 1947), p . 90 .
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the industrialists, and the international bankers . 4

The actions of

Russia's erstwhile allies, Soviet leaders felt, justified this conelusion.

Soviet Russia was not invited to participate in the Paris

Peace Conference.

Her territory was invaded by the Poles with the

tacit consent of the Allies for the purpose of doing avay •1i th the
revolutionary government .

Russian territory in Siberia was invaded,

not in theory but in fact, by the Allies to restore the rule of the
Czars.

This· theory of the Soviet rulers was further implemented by

the fact that Russia 's former territories were not restored to her,
and by the fact that the Allies considered the new Soviet government
to be a dangerous one and consequently withheld recognition . 5
Conclusions in regard to the League. --The Soviet Union's
conclusions in regard to the League were reached because of the fear
that the League was nothing more than a post-YTar alliance between
the YTartime allies to keep the Soviet Union under control.

A note

from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the SecretaryGeneral of the League, March 15, 1923, states the

viev~oint

of the

Soviet government:
It regards it (the League) as a coalition of certain
states endeavoring to usurp the power over other states
and making their attempts on the ri ghts and independence
of other nations on a false appearance of groundless
le ality and in the forms of mandates issued by the
Council or • . • the Assembly of the League of Nations .
The Soviet Government maintains its conviction that this
pseudo-international body really serves as a policy of
certain great powers or their vassals . The Soviet
Government finds confirmation of its conviction every
time that a state assuming the leading role in the League
11

Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin ( Ne,·r York : Simon
and Schuster, Avon editi on, 1967), p. 505; Edward W. Pearlstein,
(editor), Revolution in Russian, as reported by the New Yor k Tribune
and the New York Herald , ltl94-1921 (Nev York: The Viking Press, 1967),
pp . 192- 193 .
5Pearlstein, p . 194.
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of Nations makes a decision on international ~uestions
touching the interest of the Soviet Republic.
Other statements by the Soviet government reiterated this
vie1olpOint. 7
Russia still maintained that the League was a farce and held
no povrer because of the militaristic attitudes of the various Western
states who vrere looking for security .

She maintained that the League,

hovrever, vrished to keep up the appearances of fUnctionin

and search-

ing for peace by sending out invitations to all nations, including
Russia, to join in an international disarmament conference .

Soviet

Russia accepted the invitation anticipating, of course, that the
conference would end in failure .

Her purpose in attending the con-

ference 1-ras to prove to the 1-rorld that statements made by her
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Haxim Litvinov, to the effect that
total disarmament was the only way to end vrars 8 was in reality, a
prime consideration in Soviet foreign policy . 9

Litvinov, at the con-

ference , reiterated earlier statements to the effect that total
general disarmament 1-ras the only way to put an end. to wars .

He main-

tained that no other type of disarmament would work because, with
weapons , other nations would still look after their security with
these weapons .

Total disarmament, Li tvinov declared

every nation large or small down to the same level .

1-rould bring
This would

6u . S . Department of State , The United States and the Peace ,
(Washington : U. S . Government Printin Office, 1945), p . 25 .
7rbid ., p . 26 .
8rbid . , p . 4o .
York :

9Albert P . Nenarokov, Russia in the Tvrentieth Century, (New
William Morrmr & Company, 1968) p . 2t~9 .

6
make each nation equal in a military sense because no nation would
have the power to carry on armed a ression

~ainst

its neighbors.

Hith the fear of a.gression removed, Litvinov said, every nation could
feel that at last it had become more secure.10
The fact remains, hm.rever, that the Soviet Union was seeking
total disarmament in furtherance of her own national security.

Soviet

leaders realized that Russia "'\vas still in a weak position, militarily
speaking , and these leaders feared collective action on the part of
other nations.

Total disarmament, therefore, would put the Soviet

Union on the same par "'\vi th other nations in regard to military power.
This would leave her free to extend the Marxist-Leninist and later
Stalinist brand of Communism beyond her borders by political and
economic means without fear of military retaliation. 11
The Soviet Union, following the withdrawal of Germany from
the League in 1934, and believing that collective security might be
the better course because of the failure of the disarmement conferencel2 and believing that active participation in the League would
be a deterrent to Germany, the mortal enemy of Russia, joined the
League on September 18, 1934, and was given a seat on the League
Council.l3

Hith this willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to

lOMaxim Litvinov, The Soviet ' s Fight for Disarmament (New York:
International Publishers, 1932), pp . ll-13.
llRobert Payne, The Rise and Fall of Stalin (New York:
and Schuster, Avon edition, 1966) p . 589 .

Simon

l2Robert • Slusser and Jan F. Triska, Theory, Law and Policy
of Soviet Treaties, (California : Stanford University Press, 1962)
p . 262 .
York:

l3Basil Dmytryshyn, A Concise History of the U. S . S . R. , (Ne"'\v
Charles Scribner ' s Sons, 1965, pp . 202-203 .
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join the League and the willingness of the Communist party to join
in the Popular Front movements in the Western countries, it becomes
quite clear that Soviet Russia vas interested in

creatin~

a balance

of pm·rer, institutionalized or otherwise, to be directed a ainst a
powerful Germany.

Soviet Russia was attempting to use the League

to stop the creation of a balance of paver vrhich mi ght be directed
against herself, as well.

But the balance of power was

a~ain

shifting

against Russia ,., i th the si gning of the Four Power Pact of Rome, by
Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy in the summer of 1933.

14

The United States State Department recognized this fact when
it made the statement on May 27, 1933, that the pact was:
. . • a veiled attempt to complete the undermining of
League prestige, to eliminate the lesser pavers from their
increasing importance in the councils of Europe, and
to establish a sort of Directorate of Four, in which
France, deprived of her eastern alliances, and with Russia
strictly excluded, would be in a minority of one, while
Britain ' s chronic vacillation •rould make of Italy the
finger on the balance of European power . l5
This pact vas, in effect, the forerunner of the Munich Conference vhich eventually led to World War

II~ 6

Several conclusions should

have been dravrn by Soviet Russia from the si gnin
was never ratified .

o

this pact, which

The Soviet Union should have realized that the

Western European pmrers were still interested in seeing a balance of
power created vrhich would contain the U. S .S .R.

She should also have

seen that the principle of equality of all nations , •rhile true in
l4Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, (Chicago:
Rand McNally Company, 1966) , p . 312-313 .
15Morgenthau, p . 76 .
l6winston S . Churchill, The Gathering Storm, (Cambridge :
Houghton 1ifflin Company, 1948), p . 279-280.

8
theory , was never true in fact , and peace and security depended upon
a coalition of the great

owers who alone were in the uosition to keep

the peace .
Soviet leaders, however , still attempted to use the League
as a basis for building a balance of

ower directed against Germany .

The Hunich Conference , however , made the Russian leaders r ealize at
last that the .Jestern pmrers were either too weak to stop Hitler or
vrere planning again to form a Directorate of Four against Russia . 1 7

The U. S . S . R. consequently began to act unilate r ally in order to gain
mor e time t o prepar e its own defenses and t o gain buffer te r ri t or ies
betvreen the U. S . S . R. and Germany . 18
In t he eve nt of a Eur opean vrar, Soviet str at egi s t s saw tvro
alter natives fo r the Sovi et Union :

a •rar agai nst Germany i n ••hich the

Sov i et Uni on would be alli ed •ri th the West or a •rar between Germany
and t he West i n which the Sovi et Union vrould be neutral . 1 9

As Soviet

Rus s i a doubted t he YTi l l ingness of the Western power s t o enter i nt o a n
effe ct i ve alli an ce with t he Sovi et gove r nment , Sovi et strategists
chose t he second alternative :

neutral status t h r ough an agreement

with Naz i Germany .

1 7Albert Z . Carr, Truman, Stalin and Peace (New York : Doubleday and Company , 1950), p . 124; James F . Byrnes, Spe aking Frankly,
(New York : Har per Brothers, 1947) p . 283 .
l8August Rei, The Nazi-Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic States :
Diplomatic and Other Evidences (London: Boreas Publishin , 1948 ),
p. 9 ; Alfred Bilmanis, A History of Litvia (Ne•r J ersey: Princeton
University Press, 1951), p . 388 .
1 9carr, p . 123 .

-- --- - -

9

The Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed on August 23, 1939.

The

pact contained a secret protocol assigning to each Party "spheres of
influence" in the Baltic, Finland, and Poland.

20

When the war in Europe

finally broke out, Russia moved against Poland and proceeded to occupy
. fl uence. 21
her s ph ere o f ~n

Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States

of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was all but complete by 1940.

22

Soviet attempts to bring Finland under control, however, were
not successful.
Finland. 23

In the winter of 1939 the U.S.S.R. declared war on

For her actions against Finland the Soviet Union was branded

an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations.

24

This action was

considered by Moscow as further proof that the Western world vTas still
seeking to create a bloc of nations directed against the U.S.S.R.
Pre-United Nations attitudes. -- When the German attack on
Soviet Russia did come, the Soviet leaders were quite willing to join
hands with Great Britain and the United States in order to defeat the

20

Dmytryshyn, p. 207; Slusser and Triska, Theory, Law and
Policy, p. 256.
21Rei, p. 17; U. S. Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations:
1939-1941, ed. Raymond Sontag and James Beddie (New York: Didier,
Publishers, 1948), p. 95.
22

John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics and Government in the
Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 123.
23Alter Brody, et al, War and Peace in Finland: A Documental
Survey (New York: Soviet Russia Today, 1940), p. 123; Finland Reveals
Her Secret Documents on Soviet Folic March 1940-June 1941, {official
Blue-White Book of Finland , p.
24 Dmytryshyn, p. 213; David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign
Policy, 1939-1942 (Ne,·T Haven, Yale University Press, 1942), p . 151.
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Gernans .

For this reason the U. S . S . R. sou ht and obtained lend- lease

agreements with the United States . 25

These agreements

the Soviets con-

ceded , would serve world peace and would aid Russia to preserve her
national security .

The Russians aereed also with the idea that

Lend- Lease was a foundation stone for a future world

or~anization

in an

exchange of telegrams between Soviet and American leaders on the anni versary of the signing of the agreement between the United States
government and the Soviet

overnment in 1943 . 26

Even as far alonP, as the

Yalta Conference in 1945 Stalin declared this to be a fact . 27
After the Atlantic Charter was made kno>m to the world, the
Soviet

overnment expressed agreement with its princ iples insofar as

the Soviet Union was concerned throu h the Soviet ambassador to En land
in a statement to the Inter-Allied

eetin

in London, Sentenber 24, 1941 .

The statement said in part, that consistent application of the principles expressed in the Charter would be sought b. Soviet Russia , 28 that
the Soviet Union would advoc ate collect i v e security against ag ressors
as a means of advancing t he peace and se curity of the world, 2 9 and that
the Soviet Union would seek to apply the principles of self- determination

25Ivan r-taisky , Aen.ories of A Soviet Ambassador, 1939-1943,
(New York : Charles Scribner ' s Sons , 1968 ), ~ · 193; Stanley S . Jados,
Documents on Russian- Ame r i can Relat i ons (l~ashington , D. C. Catholic
Uni versi t y Press, 1965 ), pp . 94 - 95 , 97-98 .
\Tar

26Andre,·T Rothstei n, Soviet. Poli cy Dur i ng the Great Patriotic
(Ne,., York : Hutchins on and Company, 19 46 ) , I , pp . 224-225 , p . 231.

2 7Edwar d Stett i nius , Roosevelt and t he Rus sians ( New Yor k :
Doubleday , 1949 ), . 220 .
2 8u .s. Department of St ate , Pos t>Var Fore i gn Poli cy Preparation
1939 -1945 (Washin ton: U. S . Government Pr i nting Offi c e , 1 9 49 ) , p . 13 .
29Roths t e in, I , p . 97 .
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and the sovereign rights of nations in its search for peace and
secur1•t y. 30

These principles were adhered to by Soviet Russia in

several speeches by Stalin, to the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

31

and in

various treaties signed by the Soviet government at this time.

32

When the Soviet leaders set their hands to such documents
affirming the principles of the Atlantic Charter , 33 the Soviet Union
became a part of the Grand Alliance through which she realized two
objectives .

Her primary objective at this time was to seek the quickest

means for driving the German invader from her soil.

The second objec-

tive was to have herself recognized as a power on a par with the United
States so as to have an equal say in the postwar settlements.

34

With

such equality then, the U.S.S . R. could safeguard her own security while
advancing her national interests.
By becoming a member of the Grand Alliance the Soviet Union
was at last able to realize the long-term objectives she had sought
from the twenties.

The U.S.S.R. had sought to become an equal of the

United States and to be recognized as such.

For this reason the

U. S . S . R. had entered the League of Nations and had argued so steadfastly
for total disarmament.

The Soviet Union had sought to keep aggressor

nations away from her borders.
ous non-agression pacts.

For this reason she entered into vari-

The So-viet Union also sought to maintain and

extend her spheres of influence without fear of retaliation on the
30The United States and the Peace, p .
31Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33Jados, Documents , p. 87.

34 Nenarokov ,

p. 250.

41.
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part of other nations.
nilitary disarmaMent,

For this reason the U.S . S.R. had proposed total
ained a seat on the League Council, taken over

her Baltic neighbors, and signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 which
split eastern Europe into two spheres of influence.
Post-World War I Concepts and Attitudes of the
United States
American concepts and attitudes in the Twenties and early
Thirties . --The United States, too, felt that she had gained nothin
from participation in the war, a war which was not to Make the world
safe for democracy, but a •rar which •ras only to further the interests
of her former allies .

She felt that she had gained nothing from the

war but a huge amount of indebtedness on the part of her former allies
and that these debts would never be paid .
was the feeling of "Back to Normalcy" .

Coupled with this feeling

To use Calvin Coolidge's ex-

pression, "America ' s business was business" .

The United States began

to pursue a "live alone and like it" policy . 35
The policies of the United States government became very evident in its attitude toward the League .

Warren Harding exnressed the

vievrpoint of the Administration 1-rhen he said that the League would
cause the United States

overnment to surrender to a dan erous extent

its independence of action, if the United Nations joined the League . 36
There vrere, however, quite a number of Republican leaders includin
Herber t Hoover who disagreed •ri th Administration policy, and said that

35 arquis Childs and ·lilliam Stone, Toward a Dynamic America
Foreign Policy Association, 19lf3) p . 16 .

( Iew York :

36Ruhl Bartlett , The Record of American Diplomacy (New York :
Alfr ed Knopf , 1947) , p . 481 .
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the United States should join some sort of vrorld orp-anization . 37
Other Republican leaders, in the ''Statement of 31", said that the
United States should join the League, but believed in making changes
in the League for the preservation of United States rights . 38

Henry

Cabot Lodge, Senior, believed the United States should join an

or~ani-

zation composed of nations whose vital interests were in the zones of
the !forth Atlantic or that the United. States should ,join in alliance
with Great Britain and France in order to protect those vital
interests . ?9
It vras for this purpose that the Lod e reservation, Article 2
of vrhich said that the United States should have no obli at ion to
preserve the territorial intesrity or political independ.ence of any
nation, nor to interfere in controversies bet•reen nations, nor to employ military or naval forces without the consent of Con ress , and
Article 4 of which said , that the United States should have the right
to judge vrhat questions of security were to remain within United States
jurisdiction, lrere introduced into the Senate .

40

But, due to Hilson's

desire for a universal or anization, Lodge ' s desire

or a

li~ited

organization or an alliance, and the isolationists' desire for no
United States participation in any sort of organization, both the League
and the Lodge resolutions were rejected by the Senate .

41

The period

of the twenties became one in which Charles Evans Hu hes, Secretary of
37rbid . , p . 470 .
38rbid .
39Ibid .
4orbid.
41Bar lett , pp . 470 - 471 .
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State for Harding, refused to answer any and all correspondence from the
League and one in which United States observers at Geneva were instructed
not to enter any building under League authority.4 2

The attitude,

therefore, in the United States was that the country should follow
the advice of its first president and avoid entangling alliances which,
in the long run, would be detrimental to the best interests of the
United States.
American action in conjunction with the League of Nations. -The attitude of the United States government changed slightly in the late
twenties and early thirties for although the United States did not join
the League and the government maintained its former position in regard
to it, the United States government did send various representatives to
join in conferences when the national interests were involved.

The

United States sponsored the Washington Conference of 1922, took part in
the London Naval Conference of 1930, signed the Kellogg-Briand Peace
Pact, promulgated the Moratorium for the payment of international debts
in 1930, and implemented League action in regard to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 . 43

The United States official attitude,

however, continued to be one of smugness and "to the devil with Europe".
Governmental policy was best expressed in a statement made in Cleveland
by the Under-Secretary of State, William R. Castle, October 27, 1932.
"We have always to think of just one thing - what is the interest of
the United States. " 44

The United States at this time felt that she

42Thomas Bailey , A Diplomatic History of the American People
(New York: Appleton-Century, 1946), p. 481.
43John A. Krout, United States since 1865 (New York:
and Noble, Inc., 1958), pp. 185-188.

Barnes

44william R. Castle, Press Releases No. 391 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1932).

u.

S.
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could still act alone in the maintenance of her national
security.
Uevr International cooperation . -- It became increasingly
evident to the nevr Roosevelt administration, hm.,rcver, that the best
course of American policy lay in international cooperation, in the
best interests of American security rather than in isolationism .
This cooperation was to be only regional in scope, hovrever, because
American vital interests, for the Most part, lay within the t!estern
Hemisphere .

'rhis cooperation was to be nainly for the stren then-

ing of the Monroe Doctrine .

In Decenber, 1936, the principle that

an act of disturbing the peace of any one American republic affected
all the American republics was subscribed to by the United States
government delegate at the Pan-American Conference . 1l5

President

Roosevelt tried to broaden this principle in his famous "Q,uarantine
Speech" of 193746 and in a radio address on September 3, 1939, the
date of the opening of the second world war.47
It must not be supposed, however that the United States in
the early period of the Roosevelt administration uas willing or ready
to join an international orga.nization ,.,hich would
dom of action .

eopardize its free-

Cordell Hull, the American Secretary o

this quite clear in a radio address delivered at
Narch 17, 1938 . 48

State, made

Washin~ton,

America was still not ready to take an active part

in suppressing acts of aggressor nations vThich threatened the peace and
security of the entire vrorld .
45Postwar Forei~n Policy Preparation, p . 13 .
46Bartlett, p . 577 .
47Postvrar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 16 .
48
U. S . Department of State , P::.....::.e~a:..:.c...:e--:an.;;;_d_v_la-'r__: _..:...:..:Un-'i_t:..;.e_d_S_t_a,..,tr-e::-s,
Foreign Policy (vlashington, U. S . Government Pr intin~ Office , 1942) ,
pp. 407-419 .

16
Effects of German expension and aggression .

Hhile America

during this period uas pursuing a policy of cooperation without action,
affairs in Europe vrere dravring to a clinax .

Germany and Italy had be-

gun their march and the Western democracies pursued a policy of
appeasement .

Germany marched into the Rhineland and Austria, and

Italy into Ethic ia . 49

The policy of collective security was no longer

considered to be in force by the Western democracies as they pursued
their policy of appeasement .
in the fall of 1938 . 5°

Appeasement reached its zenith at Munich

The Western powers , still believing that Hitler

vrould maintain the status quo after his demands on Czechoslovakia were
achieved , and still believing that he would be a vital factor in the
creation of a balance of povrer against Soviet Russia , all01-1ed Hitler
to carr y out his dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in order to gain
''peace in our time" . 51
It was only in the summer of 1940 vTi th the fall of' the 101·1 lands , Scandinavia , and France that the United States began to realize
that German aggression threatened both the ·lest ern Hemisnhere and its
own national security, and that the United States , of necessity , must
cooperate with the forces arrayed against Hitler .

For this reason

President Roosevelt , by executive agreement, negotiated the transfer
of fifty old-age destroyers to Britain in return for the ri ght to lease
naval bases . 52

Althou h the trans er vas consummated in the name of

49churc hill , pp . 268- 271 .
50Ibid . , p . 3oo .
51Ibid . , p . 318
52Krout , U. S . Since 1865 . , p . 211 .
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national defense, it marked the beginning of active cooperation on the
part of the United States to put down aggression in the world.
Further aid to those forces resisting German aggression was
sought by the president when he asked the Congress on January 6 , 1941,
for quick enactment of a lend-lease program .

The president told the

Congress that the United States was:
• • • committed to full support of all those resolute people,
everywhere, who are resisting aggression and thereby keeping
war away from our mm hemisphere. By this support • • • we
strengthen the defense and security of our own nation.53
It was not until March 11, 1941, that Congress passed such an
act.

On the basis of this act, lend-lease agreements were concluded

with several nations who were fighting against the Germans.

The

"master agreement" signed with Britain served as the model for agreements signed with other countries including the one signed with
in the summer of 1942.

oscow

54

Although Prime Mi nister Churchill never admitted the fact,55
the Lend- Lease Agreements promulgated by the United States were a
foundation stone for the future world organization.

When Foreign

Minister Molotov visited Washington on May 29, 1942, the subject for
discussion was the lend- lease agreement soon to be signed between his
government and that of the United States, and how those agreements
might further the maintenance of peace and security for the freedomloving nations after the war.5 6

Dean Acheson , the Assistant Secretary

53 Bartlett , p. 6 01.
5 4Rothstein , I , pp . 162- 165.
55Raymond Dennet and Robert Turner , Documents on American
Foreign Policy (Boston: World Peace Foundation , 1945 -- ) , VIII , p . 839 .

56Rothstein , I , pp . 166- 167 .
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of State, in a speech on July 6, 1942, said that the Lend-Lease Agreements were not made by the United States to seek

ro it or

eturn on

investment, but were made in the interests of national security.

Na-

tional security, he declared, in turn rested on national peace.

These

agreements 1vould serve the peace by enabling the

Bi~

Four to work in

cooperation with one another towards the establishment o

a peaceful

world . 57
Closely allied with lend-lease as one of the foundations of
the United Nations Organ ization was the meeting which took place between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on the Atlantic
Ocean in the summer of 1941 .

At this meeting decisions concerning aid

to Soviet Russia took place between Churchill and Roo sevelt, and a
telegram was sent to Stalin officially suggesting a meeting on the
apportionment of joint resources.58
It was at this Atlantic meeting that the Atlantic Charter was
drawn up .

This Charter contained the "Four Freedoms", the ori inal

foundation of the United Nations . 59

This conference although it was

held for the primary purpose of coordinating American defense efforts
in the Hestern Hemisphere with British defense efforts on the continent of Europe, was the forerunner for the various meetings to be
held between the leaders of the United States and the other governments
of the United Nations for the purpose of seeking ways and means to

57Holborn, I, 97 .
58Postwar Foreign Policy , p . 49 . On this suggestion a meetin _
took place between the representatives of the Big Three the following
September .
59Henry Littlefield, New Outline-History of Europe 1815- 1942
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1942), p. 259.
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defeat the Axis nations and for the purpose of promoting plans for an
international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.
Continued American adherence to the Atlantic Charter as the
guiding objective of the United States in all postwar settlements was
g iven by the president on December 21, 1944, when he declared, "The
Atlantic Charter is just as valid today as when it was pronounced in
1941.1160
It becomes evident, therefore, that both the United States and
the Soviet Union were in full accord with the principles of the
Atlantic Charter, but for different reasons.

The United States be-

lieved that promulgation of such principles on its part would aid the
future peace and security of the world, as not only England but the
smaller nations of the world would come to realize that the United
States had their interests at heart.
common security.

Common interests would lead to

Common security would lead to a common international

organization.
Summation of Soviet and American Security Objectives
in the Twenties and Thirties
Soviet objectives. -- This examination of the foreign policies
of the United States and the Soviet Union during the twenties and thirties has shown the principle security objectives of both countries.
To some extent the future objectives of both of these countries have
also been shown.

Past Soviet objectives are the same as those of the

present, and future.

The U.S.S.R's primary objective was to halt

German aggression by the creation of a balance of power, institutionalized or otherwise.

6o

The Soviet Union's other main objectives were to

Dennet and Turner, VI, 287.
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become an equal of the United States, and to expand the influence of
Communism throughout the world without fear of retaliation from other
nations.
American objectives. -- The prime objective of the United States
in this period was to stop all aggression which threatened the vital
interests in the North Atlantic area.

Co-terminous with this objective

was the objective of protecting the Western Hemisphere from attack .
America in this period was not willing to enter into entangling alliances which might have affected its sovereignty or its freedom of
action in the international sphere.

For the future, the first two

objectives remained the same , but due to the heavy naval losses of
Britain during World War II , America found herself taking on added responsibilities.

The United States has increasingly had to fill the gap

left by the power vacuum in Western Europe after World War II.

The

United States then of necessity has had to enter into various organizations and alliances , the most important organization being the United
Nations.

CHAPTER II
CONFERENCES AND PLANS FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION
JULY, 1943- JANUARY, 1945
Foundation Stones for World Organization
The Moscow Conference -- It was this search for security on
the part of the Soviet Union and the United States which led to the
Moscow and Teheran Conferences of the Big Three in 1943.

Stalin was

interested in an alliance of the Big Three in order to find and keep
the peace and to further his own ideas of national security.

1

Roosevelt

and Churchill felt that the establishment of a world organization would
be for their own best interests because the common interests of most of
the nations of the world would be in accord with their own interests.
In this way the two great 1-lestern powers felt they could achieve
national security.
The Moscow Conference marked a turning point for the United
States, Great Britain, and Russia for it was the first time the Grand
Alliance became institutionalized.

2

It was at this conference that

these three countries agreed that Big Three unanimity which was a reality in the war must be continued into the postwar world so that each
nation could reach its objectives in concert with the other two and yet
not be hampered by restrictions on national sovereignty.

These leaders ,

therefore, came to the conclusion that an international organization
1

2

stett1n1us
· · ,

p . 296 •

Ibid.
21
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based on the principles of national sovereignty and on the principles
set forth in the Atlantic Charter must be established.

A joint com-

munique to this effect was issued simultaneously by the governments of
the Big Three on October 30, 1943,3 and in the "Declaration of the
Four Nations", issued on November 1 , 1943. 4
The Conference also marked a turning point in the foreign affairs of both the United States and Russia for it was the first time
that either of these two countries were agreed on the fact that peace
and security ·depended upon some kind of world organization which required
their active participation.5

The Declaration also marked a turning point

in international affairs for, although it recognized the fact that all
nations both great and small should be members of a world organization,
it stated the fact that general peace and security depended, for the
most part, on the joint action of the big powers.
The Declaration was not just a statement issued by the governments concerned which could be ignored at a later date.

This, at least,

was the opinion of the United States gove rnment for it proposed on
November 18, 1943, if the other governments approved, that the four
parties to the Moscow Declaration would welcome all peace-loving states
to the establishment of a general international organization.

This

proposal received the approval of the Russian government only, but in

3Rothstein, II, p. 241

4u.s.

Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States : Conferences at Cairo and Yalta, 1943, p . 387; The United
States and the Peace, pp. 5-7 .
5Ibid.
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November, 1943, the British gave oral consent to the suggestion by
asking the State Department about methods of procedure in setting up
a world organization.6
Teheran . -- At Teheran the leaders of the Big Three met in
November, 1943 to discuss methods of peace .

Again it was stated that

there should be a general international organization which would
prevent the outbreak of such wars as were being waged while the
conference was in session. 7

No commitments were made by any of the

three leaders at this time, in the realm of world politics and organization,8 although both Roosevelt and Stalin had discussed in general
terms the type of organization to be erected.
Roosevelt's conception of an international organization was
that it should be composed of three main bodies.

The first body was

to be an Assembly of all the members of the United Nations from all
over the world.

The second body was to be the Executive Committee

consisting of the Big Four plus the representatives of two European
nations, one South American nation, one Middle Eastern nation, one Far
Eastern nation, and one British dominion.
would deal with all non-military questions.

This executive committee
The third body, as set

forth by Roosevelt, was to be the "Four Policemen" which was to be

6u.s. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation,
1939-1945. (Washington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1949),
pp. 246-247.
7James P. Warburg, Foreign Policy Begins at Home (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1944), p. 211.

~ostwar

Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 200.

~----------------------------- ------------------

- -- -

24

the enforcing agency.

The United States was to provide only naval

and air forces for that agency.9
By Stalin's questioning, following Roosevelt's explanation ,
it can be seen that Stalin was vitally int erested as to whether
decisions of the executive body would be binding, and that he regarded
the Europe an area as vitally important, more so than Asia.lO
There seems to have been no discussion between the two
leaders as to the possibility that an aggressor nation might be one
of the Big Four.
Roosevelt returned to this country and in his "State of the
Union" message of January, 1944, made it clear to the Congress that
national security was his main concern at both the Moscow and the
Tehe ran Conferences:
The one supreme objective for the future, which we
discussed for each nation individually and for all the
United Nations, can be summed up in the one word: Security.
And that means not only physical security, which provides safety from attack by aggressors, but also means economic securitl, social security, and moral security--in a family
of nations . 1
With the end of these conferences, the underlying ideas of
the future United Nations Organization had been formed.

The United

Nations Declaration of January, 1942, formed the wartime coalition of
the great powers .

The Moscow Conference made it clear t hat the

great powers thought it necessary to establish a world organization .
9Robert E . Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York:
Harper Brothers, 1948), p . 785; U. S. Dept . of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1943, pp . 530-531.
lOsherwood, pp . 785-786.
llHolborn, p . 259.
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At Teheran it was realized that it was the responsibility of the
Big Four, in particular, and of all the United Nations to make the
peace. 12
When it became evident that the Big Four were agreed on the
idea of a general international organization, it was imperative that
preparation should be made and plans drawn up by the various leaders,
embodying their ideas on the function and organization of such a body.
The groundwork for a definite international organization
with active participation on the part of the United States had already been laid before the Moscow Conference.

On September 1 , 1943,

a conference of Republican leaders at Mackinac Island, Michigan,
1
endorsed United States participation in a postwar world organization. 3
This endorsement was translated into legislative action on the part of
Congress with the passage of the Fulbright resolution1 4 on
1
September 21, 1943, and the passage of the Connally resolution 5 on
November 5, 1943 .

Plans for World Organization
United States plans. -- Both the United States and Russia were
working on plans for a world organization in this period.

The United

States had presented five plans to either the president or
l2Leland Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United
Nations (2d ed.; Boston : World Peace Foundation, 1949), pp. 4-5 .
13Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 196.
14The United States and the Peace , p. 5.
1 5rbid., p . 8
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the secretary of state in the period extending from July 14, 1943 to
July 18, 1944 . 1 6
The absolute

~principle,

that is, the principle of allow-

ing one permanent member to cast a negative vote to halt action, on
all matters concerning enforcement action and on all matters of pacific
1
settlement was contained in only one plan, that of July 14, 1943 . 7
The absolute protective veto principle , that is , the principle of
allowing one permanent member to cast a negative vote on all enforcement matters in order to protect that nation's sovereignty on the use
of its troops, to protect that nation's sovereignty in matters of
domesti c jurisdiction, to protect that nation's satellites, was
included in all the other plans .

Provision was made in all the other

plans that abstaining members were to be obligated by the majority
decision. 1 8

In the December 29 plan the vote of a party on the Council

and involved in a dispute was not to be counted . 1 9

In the July 18 , 1944,

plan provisions were to be made later in case one or more of the permanent members was a party to a dispute.20
All of these plans recognized that the Big Four must be
unanimous in decisions relating to the determination of threats to the
peace, terms of settlement for disputes in which they w·ere not involved, measures of enforcement, regulation of armaments, and, in the

16Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 473.
1 7Ibid., p . 473.
18Ibid . , PP· 473-495 .
1 9Ibid . , p . 534 .
20ibid . , P· 595 .
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last analysis, >There sovereignty was to lie.

All of these plans

recognized the right of veto on these matters as a prerogative of the
great powers.
These plans showed the world that the United States was still
fearful for its own peace, security, and sovereignty, but that the
United States was willing to join an international organization which
would not circumscribe her soverei gnty and security.

These plans did

show the world that the United States was more willing than was the
Soviet Union to allow the international organization to make decisions
to which she could subscribe without a loss of freedom of action .
Four of these plans did limit the unanimity principle to the extent
that an abstaining power would be bound by the decision of the other
members of the Council.
Soviet plans . -- The Russians, too, were interested in plans
for an international organization.

But they desired an international

organization constructed in such a manner as would allow them to retain their national sovereignty and independence of action in
international and domestic affairs.
The Soviet Union had stated her desire to join an international
organization as early as 1942.2 1

But it was not until after the Dum-

barton Oaks Conversations, which left unsettled the question of voting,
that the Russians began to set forth ideas on exactly what their plans
for a world organization might be .

As Joseph Stalin said in a speech

to the Russian people on November 6, 1944, security was the main problem for the Russian leaders.22
21Holborn , I, p. 365; United States Department of State ,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943 , I, p . 1050 .
22Rothstein , II, pp. 31- 32.
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This speech set the pattern for more elaborate plans which
appeared in various official organs of the Russian government .

The

Soviet leaders were primarily concerned with creating an organization
whose prime purpose would be to obviate the recurrence of German aggression with a view to avoiding the mistakes of the Allies following
the first vrorld vrar.

The future organization must be built on the

agreement , unanimity, and close cooperation of the great powers of the
23
. German coa1·t
·
an t ~~ ~on.

Several articles made it abundantly clear

that the Soviet Union would not participate in any international organization patterned after the defunct League , the reason being that the
Soviet Union would not agree to join an international organization
which could later be used against her, as was the case in the League.
One Soviet writer proposed that in the future world organization the leading and decisive role be played by the big powers
who would assume active leadership,
element of the organization.

and who would form the central

These great powers, this writer continued,

must assume the obligation to resist aggression, if necessary , with
their armed forces alone, irrespective of the attitudes of the other
members of the organization.

This, of course, meant that the responsi-

bility for maintaining peace would rest not within an impersonal
organization or with fifty or sixty nations, but would rest within an
organization headed by a league of the great powers.

Such a league

would, of necessity, in matters concerning the direction of the organization , and in matters of important nature, mean unanimity among the
members of the league .

In order to put their decisions into effect, it

23Rothstein , II, pp. 31-32.
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was this writer ' s opinion that these countries ought to be given, in a
constitutional fashion, formal authority appropriate to their real and
de facto obligations. 24

This writer felt that aggression must be

stopped in the shortest possible time, but he did not favor big,
independent armies .

The best way to stop aggression, he stated, was

to have an air force which could be under international control . 25
This same writer went on to say that the Soviets did not agree
to the principle of unanimity in the League of

ations because what

was thought to be unanimity was , in reality, a lack of it .

One nation

could stop any action to be taken on the part of the League, no matter
what was the size of that nation .

Big Five unanimity would be dif-

ferent because they would have a common purpose and interests, because
they would act quickly in an emergency, and would not be stopped in
their actions by a vote of a small power.26
Another writer of the Soviet Union maintained the principle of
unanimity and accord between the great powers was necessary because
they alone possessed the resources to keep the peace .

In any future

organization, however, the principle of national sovereignty must be
maintained and a permanent member must , therefore , be allowed to vote
on questions concerning that nation ' s self- interest.

This writer

maintained further that Soviet juristic thought had always paid more

24 charles Prince, "Current Views of the Soviet Union on the
International Organization of Security, Cooperation, and International
Law", AJIL, 39, September, 1945, pp . 452-453 .
2 5Ibid . , p . 453 .
26Ibid., p . 453 .
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attention to geopolitics and economics, rather than law, and that
the Soviet validated all its actions on these grounds . 2 7
The Soviet Union could not depend upon the fiction of
"legality" in any future organization because some nations who might
become members of that organization might be nations who refused to
recognize or would refuse to recognize the Soviet Union .

If this were

the case, the Soviet Union could see no reason why she could rely on
the impartiality of "decisions" of these nations . 2 8
It becomes obvious that the Soviet Union was interested in
only some of the same concepts for a world organization which interested the United States .

The Soviet leaders were interested in joint

cooperation and unanimity among the great powers as a deterrent to
future German aggression, but Stalin recognized the importance of
keeping Russian national interests protected and for this reason de manded the absolute veto on matters vitally affecting these interests.
Soviet concepts were different from American concepts in
regard to the type of organization to be established .

vfuereas the

Americans desired an organization in which the small powers would be
included and would have some function in the maintenance of world
peace , t he Soviet leaders felt that the world organization should be
controlled by the big powers , and the smaller nations should accept
without question the authority of those powers. 2 9

27Ibid ., p . 455 .
2 8Ibid . , P . 458 .
29Jados, Documents , p. 145.
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It was a known fact that the Russians vehemently opposed any
such plan which would not allow the great powers to completely dominate the new organization, and although the Soviets were careful to
safeguard their own sovereignty, they did not want the lesser powers
to exercise their sovereignty to such an extent that a great bloc of

°

national votes could be used against them. 3

For this reason they

could not agree to any voting plan on a straight national basis which
might put the Soviet Union in the minority.
They agreed, however, with the United States that this
association of big powers would be intrusted not only with efforts to
achieve a peace over the common foe, but would also be intrusted with
the establishment of a just and lasting peace, and the establishment of
economic, political and cultural cooperation among nations.

Dumbarton Oaks
Agreement on absolute protective veto on enforcement measures.-The United States and the Soviet Union were in agreement on most of the
purposes , functions, and obligations of the proposed organization.

Be-

cause of this, and because the American proposals were most complete ,
both the Soviets and the British accepted the American position as the
basis for discussion at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington, D.c . 31
None of the four major powers was willing to accept at Dumbarton
Oaks the straight majority vote on substantive questions, for such a

30

~., p. 146.

3lPostwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 315; Krout, p. 233.
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vote would mean that the armed forces of any nation could be used
without its consent, that decisions could be reached which would adversely affect one of the great powers without its consent, and that
economic sanctions could be applied against one of the great powers or
its satellites without that power's consent.32
Disagreement on abstention . -- The disagreement between the
Russians and Americans revolved around the question of whether members
of the Security Council that were parties to a dispute, including disputes involving the use of sanctions, including the parties that were
major nations with permanent membership on the Council, would have the
right to vote or to be required to abstain from voting in decisions by
the Council on the dispute . 33

This question was fundamental to the

rights and obligations of members in the organization, and to the basic
principles on which the organization would fUnction .
The British came to Dumbarton Oaks with the view that the votes
of any party to any dispute would not be taken into account, as was the
case in all matters in the League .

The American position was that a

permanent member, like a non- permanent, should not vote in connection
w·i th any dispute to which it was a party.

The Soviet representatives

held the contrary view for they felt that, on any matter concerning
their vital interests, they should be able to protect those interests
at all costs . 34
32J ados , p . 146; Richard Ttl. Leopold, The Growth of American
Foreign Policy, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Publisher, 1962), p . 624.
33Jados, p . 150; U. S . Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States , 1945, p . 302-303.
34Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 317 .
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It became increasingly evident throughout the Dumbarton Oaks
discussions that this question would not or could not be resolved .
Recognition of such a right as reserved by the Soviets would , in ef·feet, signify an absolute veto by a major power that was a party in
such a matter .

Soviet insistence that the right of absolute veto be

kept by the major powers in such cases was voiced from the start of
the matter's consideration and when it continued unmodified, Secretary
of State Hull discussed the matter with the Soviet representative,
Andrei Gromyko, without avail.
Gromyko, while informed by Roosevelt that the United States
would agree to a simple majority of the eleven members of the Council
on matters of procedure , was also informed that the American people
would never agree to the great powers possessing an absolute veto as
demanded by the Russians, for it was the American concept of justice
that a litigant should never be able to decide his own case.

Gromyko

was also informed that the smaller nations would never agree to the
Russian proposal.

Gromyko remained adamant in his viewpoint in re-

gard to the absolute veto.35
Roosevelt, on the advice of Hull, sent Stalin a cablegram
expressing the American viewpoint.

Stalin replied negatively to the

cablegram, saying that he believed in the unanimity of the great powers
in all matters.

He did say that he would not object to an effort

to work out a special formula for disputes not involving sanctions.

36

35stettinius, pp. 20-22 .; Leopold , p. 628 .
36stettinius, p. 17. (Such a formula was later worked out by
the State Department and sent to Churchill and Stalin December 5, 1944,
and later agreed upon at Yalta.); Jados, Documents, p. 150.
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When Andrei Gromyko stated his government ' s final position , it
posed the question whether to continue the Conversations in an effort
to resolve the issue .

The United States offered one last compromise

proposal but even this was rejected by the Soviet repre sentative . 37
On the 17th of September after a conference with Hull, Stettinius
talked with Gromyko to get a change of position.

He also talked with

Alexander Cadogan, the British representative, about the whole affair,
but the Soviet representative remained firm . 38

The Failure of the Voting Question
Gromyko stated that an agreement by his government on any
date for a general conference of the United Nations would depend upon
whether the British and American governments would accept the Soviet
position on voting in the Security Council, and agreement on the proposal that all Soviet Republics be initial members of the organization .
On the first of these proposals the explanation was made that the Soviet
government continued to consider that the principle of unanimity of
the four great pmrers must be carried out unconditionally; on the
second , no explanation vras given . 39

It was decided to leave the chap-

ter on voting procedure open for discussion at a later date .
Even with this vital problem left unsettled , it was felt
that the Conversations were successful and steps taken in the right
direction toward the establishment of an international organization .
3 7Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p . 324 .
38rbid . , p . 327 .
39Ibid ., p. 328.
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It was thought a certainty that the differences left unsettled at
Dumbarton Oaks would not remain unsettled.

Stalin pointed this out

when he said,
"'rhe surprising thing is not that differences exist, but
that there are so few of them, and, that as a rule, in
practically every case they are resolved . . . n40
The conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the
publication by the participating governments of the "Tentative Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization"
represented the first important step in the implementation of the
general policy expressed in the Moscow Four Power Declaration, the
Teheran Conference, and the numerous statements of President Roosevelt
and Cordell Hull .
Following the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, the question on
voting vrhich remained unsettled was fraught with difficulty.

The

representatives of Great Britain and the United St&tes were willing
to make some concessions to Russia in regard to the voting question,
but they were not willing to make the concessions that the Soviet
Union desired .
Roosevelt, accordingly, sent telegrams on December 5 and 6, 1944,
to Stalin in the form of a message conveyed through Ambassador Harriman,
who asked to discuss the voting question with Stalin .

The telegram

suggested an early meeting between the heads of the three governments
to iron out the difficulties which had arisen .

40 rbid, p . 337 .

Harriman, however, did

36
not get to see Stalin until December 14.

Stalin told Harriman that

he needed more time to study the proposals . 4l
But even with the announcement of the United States proposal, the sending of the telegram, and the meeting between Harriman
and Stalin, the Soviets remained adamant .

Stalin replied to

Roosevelt ' s telegram by saying that he saw no possibility of agreeing
to the proposed formula . 42
Vandenberg works for organization . -- The rejection by Stalin
of the proposed voting formula was taken by many to mean a failure,
before it was even born, of a world organization.

Many leaders in the

United States did not take such a dim view, however .

Senator

Vandenberg declared on January 10 , 1945, during a debate on foreign
policy in the United States senate that the United States still proposed
" . . to help create a post - war world on a basis which shall
stop aggressor s for keeps, and, so far as is humanly possible,
substitute justice for force among free men . We propose to
do it primarily for our own sake"
and that the United States would be willing to join in an "alliance"
with Britain and Russia for this purpose .

He continued in this same

spee ch ,
" . . I want a new dignity and a new authority for international law . I think that American self- interest requires
it . "

41~ . , p . 381 . ; Jados , p . 152-153; Stettinius, p . 22 .

42Postwar For eign Policy Preparation , p . 382 .
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He declared that real self-interest lies in collective security,43
an idea which the Russians were proclaiming to the world in pre-war
days.

By analyzing these remarks, it can be seen that Vandenberg was

quite close to the Russian concept of unanimity .

It can be seen that

Vandenberg envisaged the new world organization as a continuation
of the wartime grand alliance to stop aggression by any country excepting the Big Five, as the wartime grand alliance had stopped the
aggression of Germany, Japan, and Italy, by united action.

These

views were not far from the views held by the senior Henry Cabot
Lodge . 44

By Vandenberg ' s remarks, it can be seen also that he was

in agreement with the Russian viewpoint in that he felt the interests
of this country were paramount in setting up any such world organization.

United States Proposal of January 15, 1945
on Voting
When the Administration leaders became certain, because of
Senator Vandenberg's remarks, that both Republicans and Democrats
were willing to join in an international organization to safeguard
American interests and security, they worked all the harder for a solution to the voting problem.

In January , 1945, copies of a paper

containing the United States' ideas on what should be the substantive
and procedural decisions on which the Security Council would have to
vote were given informally to the British and Soviet ambassadors in
Washington .
43The United States and the Peace , pp . 30- 31 .
44samuel Flagg Bemis , The United States as a World Power
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950) , pp. 174-175.
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~ualified

veto in pacific settlement. -- The paper said

that on an affirmative vote of seven members, including the permanent
members of the Council would be required , except that in an event a
permanent member was a party to a dispute or situation before the
Council, that member should not be allowed to vote in decisions listed
un der " Promotion of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes" .

These would

include questions as to whether a dispute or a situation brought before
the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is
likely to threaten the peace, whether the Council should call on the
parties to settle or adjust the dispute by means of their own choice,
whether the Council shoulo make recommendations to the parties as to
methods and procedures of settlement, whether legal aspects of the
matter before it (the Council) should be referred to the International
Court, and whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful
settlement of disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern
itself with the controversy . 45
ew role of enforcement agencies . -- This proposal •ras different from the earlier United States proposals in that the earlier
proposals took no account of other existing agencies which could be
used to settle disputes by peaceful means .
Absolute protective veto on substantive matters . -- On all
other substantive matters not dealing with pacific settlement absolute
unanimity would be required among the permanent members .

46

45postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p . 654 . ; U. S . Department
of State , Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, P · 772 .
46Ibid .

CHAPTER III

YALTA PJ D SAl FRANCISCO
The Yalta Conference
Conference arrangements. -- It was important that some avenue
of compromise was left open, and the suggestion was made and agreed
upon that the leaders of the Big Three get together and discuss the
problem of voting, along with other wartime problems , at Yalta .
The leaders in all three countries were positive that an
organization which would place in the hands of the Grand Alliance
ultimate powers of peace and security must come into being if only to
safeguard their own national interests and security.

These leaders,

therefore, were willing to go to great lengths to work out these
problems on the highest level.
It was perhaps this feeling of common necessity that the
Yalta Conference marked the high tide of British, Soviet, and American
cooperation on the war and postwar settlements. 1

The leaders of the

three countries were sure that the deadlock on the voting problem
could be broken at Yalta because the conference constituted a stage
of discussion on the highest policy level while the Dumbarton Oaks
Conversations constituted a stage of decisions on the highest technical level. 2
1 stettinius, p . 4.
2Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 393.
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The surprising thing is that, although the conference was
of such an jmportant nature, there is no single official record of
the meetings .

The Soviets, who made all the arrangements for the

conference, felt that pressure would not be applied to the policy
makers if such a record was not kept.

They also felt a more friendly

feeling might prevail both during the conference and afterwards if
words that were uttered in haste at the conference were not taken down
verbatim.

The only reliable source as to what took place at the

conference comes from those men who were at the conference, took notes,
and later wrote about the conference.3
The only full-length discussion of the voting problem took
place on February 6, 1945 , in Livadia Palace .

It was at this meeting

that Sec retary of State Stettinius gave an explanation to the three
leaders of the proposed voting formula which had been sent to the
three ambassadors of those countries the preceding December . 4
Basic conceptual differences . -- Both Roosevelt and Stalin
had made clear their positions on the matter of voting and on the
matte r of world organization in general.

Their positions had been

made quite clear long before the Yalta Conference by plans, speeches,
statements, and documents put forward by themselves and their associates.

Roosevelt thought the most important thing was to keep

the unity of the great powers for the purpose of defeating Germany and
then to get the great powers around a conference table to work out a

3stettinius, p . 104.
4Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p . 395 . ; U. S. Department
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p . 735.
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world organization which would grant to these powers the major part
in keeping the peace, but which at the same time would give the small
nations some voice in their destiny.5

The American concepts would

have placed a limitation on the great powers' use of the veto in
matters of pacific settlement.
The Soviets were of a mind that unanimity among the great
powers should be kept both during and after the war so that a recurrence of aggression on the part of Germany or any other nation,
excluding the Big Four, which might desire to pursue the same course
would not be possible .
American viewpoint.

'l'o this extent, the Russians agreed with the

But the Soviet Union deviated from the American

viewpoint on the type of world organization to be set up.

The U.S.S.R .

was primarily concerned with a world organization which would be run
solely by the big powers.

It was because of this basic difference

in concepts that no solution thus far had been worked out on the
voting problem .
Even at Yalta, the basic differen_c e in concepts was shown
by the statement of the various leaders.

Joseph Stalin made it quite

clear that the three great powers which had borne the brunt of the
war should be the ones to preserve the peace .

He said it was ridicu-

lous that the small powers should have the same voice as the Big
Three .

He was prepared , he declared, to join with the United States

and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers, but
he would never agree to having any action of the Big Powers submitted
to the judgment of the small powers .

5stettinius , p. 188 .
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"Yugoslavia, Albania, and such small countries do not
deserve to be at this table . . . We three have to decide
how to keep the peace of the world, and it will not be
kept unless we three decide to do it . "6
Presentation of the American viewpoint.

The American Posi-

tion on Voting was read at the Third Formal Meeting of the Yalta
Conference . 7

The American viewpoint stated that there should be

absolute unanimity among the great powers on enforcement measures
for the preservation of peace with a provision for a fair hearing for
all members of the Organization .

It was the viewpoint of the United

States that on pacific settlements of disputes, a qualified voting
system be used, so as not to block investigation of such a dispute
in the Council .

It was held that these proposals provided a reason-

able, solution to the whole problem , at the same time combining in
a satisfactory manner the basic concepts8 of the United States leaders
and its people.9
It may be argued that the principle of the absolute protective
veto as set forth in the American proposal was contrary to American
standards of justice, but Roosevelt, remembering Wilson's troubles
with the Senate in regard to the League, and keeping in mind that the
Charter would eventually be submitted to the Senate for ratification,
was particularly conscious of the importance of this type of veto

6Ibid ., p. 112.; u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of
The United States 2 1943, p . 589 .
7Appendix I.
Bstettinius , P· 142.
9Ibid. , p . 196 . ; u . s . Department of State, Foreign Relations of
The United States 2 1943, p . 662.
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as a form of insurance against commitment of American forces, and
as insurance that American sovereignty would be protected . 1 0
Explanation of effect of the formula. -- At this session of
the conference Stettinius gave an explanation of the American proposals on decisions of the Security Council.

The Secretary explained

that there were some decisions which would require the affirmative
votes of the seven members of the Security Council, except that a
member could not cast its vote in any such decisions that concerned
disputes to which it was a part . 11
The idea of the American proposal was that any member that
was a party to the dispute should abstain from voting on decisions
relating to that dispute as long as the decisions referred to pacific
settlement or peaceful adjustment - the qualified veto.

On the other

hand, decisions relating to the determination of the existence of a
threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, and decisions to use
enforcement measures would, in all cases, require the unanimous
agreement of all the permanent members , even the parties to a dispute - the absolute protective veto. 1 2

Only procedural matters would

require a simple majority of any seven members of the Council .
Soviet adherence to the formula . -- After these explanations
concerning the American proposal were given the meeting was adjourned
at the request of Stalin to give the Soviet delegation time to study
lOsherwood, p. 855; U. S . Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943, p. 803 , 811 .
11stettinius, p . 143 .
12stettinius, p . 45 . ; U.S . Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 2 1943, pp. 943-944 .
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1
t he proposals i n t he li ght of t he Ame rc an explanation. 3

Stalin

agr eed to the voting formula as pres ented by t he Americ ans an d agr eed
wit h the Americans that their voting formula would indeed keep the
gr e at powers united.l4
Concessions Made in Re gard
to the Voting Formula
Soviet concession on the qualified veto. -- Stalin's concess ion to America was that he agreed to that part of the voting formula
in which it was implicit that a major power could not by its veto
prevent the Council from considering a dispute falling under pacific
settlement, even though such consideration would advertise the involvement of said power in the dispute . 1 5

Stalin felt that the absolute

protective veto would thoroughly protect Russia's vital interests.
This concession on the part of the Soviet Union came about because
the United States, in another phase of the Yalta Conferences, admitted
1
Russia 's traditional position as a Pacific power . 6
American concession on the absolute protective veto. -America 's concession to Russia was that Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's
demands for an absolute protective veto. 1 7

Roosevelt did not re gard

this as a concession to Russia for he thought, as stated before, that

13Postwar Foreign Policy Prepar ation, p . 395 .
l4stett inius, p. 171 .
1 5sherwood, p. 855 .; U. S . Department of State , Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943, pp . 966- 968 .
16 sumner Welles , "Roosevelt and the Far East -Part II",
Harper 's Magazine , 202 (Mar ch, 1951), p . 77.

l7 Sherwood, p . 855 .; Leopold , p . 624 .
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the American Senate would demand some sort of insurance against
United States involvement in all sorts of wars in all parts of the
world , and as insurance that American sovereignty would be protected
before the Senate would ratify the Charter.
Reasons for Russian Demands for Membership of the
Soviet Republics
Soviet Union demands that its member republics be given
seats in the proposed world organization was indirectly related to the
problem of the veto and the principle of unanimity in that it showed
at an early date that Russia was primarily interested in its own
national security.

Although the Ukraine and Byelorussia were to be

technically considered independent, 1 8 these two nations would follow
Soviet policy in every respect.

This would, in effect, give the

Soviet Union greater bargaining power in the Security Council, if
either of these two nations were elected to that body, and in the
General Assembly.

By having these two nations admitted to the United

ations and possibly to the Security Council, Stalin would reach his
most important objective. 1 9
This plan for formation of a Soviet bloc of states in the
United Nations fitted in with the whole pattern of Soviet policy
as analyzed by Averill Harriman in the fall of 1944 .

20

Stalin was

more interested in Soviet security through the creation of a Soviet

l8Jados, Documents, p. 157.
1 9stettinius, p . 187.; U. S . Department of State , Foreign
Relati ons of the United States, 1945, pp . 197-198.
20 stettinius, p . 310 .
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bloc and through the creation of a ring by Soviet domination in
the border countries than through the security offered by Soviet
participation in the Grand Alliance in the United Nations . 21
American Reaction to Soviet Demands
When Stalin presented his arguments in regard to the admission of two or three more Soviet republics, Roosevelt began to
acquiesce for he felt that actual power would rest in the hands of
the Grand Alliance in the Security Council .

In that body, each country

would have only one vote, and any one of the major powers could block
the decision, in matters of enforcement, of a group of nations arrayed
against it .

Roosevelt felt, therefore, that two or three more Russian

votes out of fifty in the General Assembly wouldn't make too much
difference . 22

He was not, however, willing to see the security of

the United States endangered by a bloc of Soviet votes in the Assembly.
The San Francisco Conference
Pre-Conference agreement among big powers. -- The major
problems of each nation concerning the creation of a world organization
were known long before the beginning of the San Francisco Conference. 2 3
The various conferences of the foreign ministers and the heads of
states of the big powers had done much either to solve or compromise
these problems .

By the time the conference began the decisions and

21Welles, Harper's (March, 1951), p . 78.
22stettinius, p . 188.; Jados, p . 170.
23stettinius, pp . 283-285 . ; U. S. Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1945, pp . 712-719 .
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compromises as to which was to have the higher order, world organization or national sovereignty, had been reached by the big powers .

24

The safeguarding of the national sovereignty and the national
security for each of the big powers had been the fundamental objectives.
These objectives had been reached by the recognition among the big
powers that they were the only ones capable of keeping the peace , and
that the small power ultimately must bend to the will of the big
powers .

Recognizing these facts, the big powers realized that, of

necessity, they must be unified in their actions, but actions taken
against their own interests must not be permitted.
Conference voting procedures . -- In the first days of the
conference it was decided that each delegate was to have one vote in
each body of the conference in which it was represented, 2 5 and it
was decided that a majority vote would suffice on

n~thods

of procedure,

and a two- thirds majority would be necessary on other questions.26
Small Eower inequality. -- The Charter of the United Nations
has as its first principle that "The Organization is based on the
sovereign equality of all members." 27
equality the United

Despite this manifestation of

ations is not primarily an organization in

which principles of equality appear to occupy a paramount or even a
24Dennet and Turner, VIII, pp . 361- 363 .
25wellington Koo, Jr . , Voting Procedures in International
Political Organizations ( ew York : Columbia University Press, 1947),

P· 8.
26u . s . Department of State, Selected Documents on the United
ations Confer ence on International Or anization (Washington : u . s .
Government Printing Office , 19 6 , p . 75 .
27 Ibid . , p . 207 .
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principal place.

The Security Council, with its methods of voting,

denies at the outset the equality of the member states.
Although some of the delegations from the small nations with
the memory of Munich fresh in their minds were opposed to giving the
Security Council any power to impose a particular settlement, most of
the smaller nations were anxious to have the Security Council assume
direct responsibility for keeping the peace and, therefore, did not
th e app1 1cab1l1ty
.
. .
.
ques t 1on
of the veto power. 28

The smaller states

at no time desired to possess the veto power themselves.

They merely

did not wish the larger states to be able to halt the machinery of
the organization whenever it seemed to the small members that a decision in the Security Council might injure the interests of the Big
Powers.

29
Attempts by small powers to limit the veto. -- Many methods

and suggestions were put forth in the form of amendments by the small
powers .

Some of the amendments favored the enlargement of the number

of non-permanent members in the Security Council, taking away some of
its powers, of limiting its powers, or making it responsible in some
manner to the General Assembly.30

The Soviet representative's reply

was that actions of the Security Council should be fast and effective.
The suddenness of enemy action during the last war, he said, ought to
prove this point. 31

This was also the attitude of the United States.

28Koo, p. 124.
29
~·' p. 139.
30 Selected Documents of UNCIO, pp. 267-400.
31

~., p. 253.

Amendments to limit veto power. -- The Australian delegate,
speaking for all the small nations, introduced several amendments
which would have limited the veto power of the Bi g Five . 3 2

However,

the amendment failed passage by a vote of ten pros, twenty cons, and
fifteen abstentions.33

These abstentions were all cast by s mall powers

who feared to vote for the amendments because the bi g powers made it
quite clear that they would accept no further changes in the Yalta
formula . 34

It was either the Charter with the veto or no Charter at

all. 35
Concessions to the small powers. -- In deference to the smaller
nations the Charter did provide that, in the election of the six nonpermanent members of the Security Council, "due regard" is to be
"especially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of members
of the United

I

at ions to the maintenance of international peace and

security, and to the other purposes of the organization" . 36

"Due

regard" was to be paid to "equitable geographical distribution"~7
It was also decided that the Security Council should make annual reports to the General Assembly as a concession to the small powers .
32Ibid , p . 151; U. S . Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United states, 1945 , pp. 1340-1343 .
33Koo, pp . 153-154 .
34selected Documents of the UNCIO , p . 433 .
35F. 0 . Wilcox, "Yalta Voting Formula in the Security Council ,"
American Political Science Review, 39 (October, 1945), p. 954 .
36vera M. Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace (New York:
\fui ttlesey House , 1946) , p . 7 .
37Ibid . ; U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States;-1945, pp . 1126, 1199 .
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vli th these concessions given to the smaller powers, voting

on the Yalta formula was in favor of the Big Five.

38

Checks on the big pmvers. -- Although the Big Powers retained
control in the Security Council, there were checks on that power.
Big Five did not constitute a majority.

The

The five powers must secure

the votes of two other powers for action.

The five non-permanent

members can, by acting jointly, veto any decision of the big powers.
And a most important check, no state or group of states can prevent
any nation from bringing a dispute before the Security Council to
obtain a hearing . 39
But each of the great powers regarded the absolute protective
veto as a safeguard for itself against any enforcement measures put
forward to its disadvantage by any power or group of powers.

The

absolute protective veto was a precaution against any proposal that
the small powers might make which would commit the big powers to action
including troops without their consent.

40

Signature and Ratification
On the twenty- sixth day of June, 1945, the aspirations
of mankind were fulfilled with the signing of the United

ations Charter

establishing a world organization to promote international peace and
security .

It remained for the member nations to approve and ratify

the Charter.

3 Bnennet and Turner, VII, p. 447.
39Norman J. Padelford, "The Use of the Veto" , International
Organization (June , 1948), p . 229 .
4owilcox, p . 952.
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There was little doubt that the Charter would be ratified.
The arguments presented to the Senate by members of the United States
delegation precluded the idea that the United States would be involved
in situations and wars about which she would have no say .

John Foster

Dulles made this point quite clear in a statement before the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Senate :
Actually the document before you charts a path which
we can pursue joyfully and without fear . Under it we remain
masters of our own destiny. The Charter does not subordinate us to any super government . There is no right on
the part of the United Nations Organization to intervene
in our domestic affairs without our consent. If the joint
adventure fails , we can withdraw.4l
With such arguments being presented , it was not unusual that
the Senate ratified the Charter by a vote of 89 to 2 .

As a result of

this action the United States became the first nation in the world to
ratify the Charter. 42

Ratification by Russia followed soon after .

Conclusions in Regard to the Charter and
the Unanimity Principle
An attempt at security . -- The United States and the Soviet

Union , in the search for security, had made a long twenty-year march from
isolationism to international cooperation.
In this march , both of these nations realized, as did the
other signatory nations, that there were no idealistic, unrealistic
objectives contained within the Charter .

They all realized that the

primary task of the United Nations was to answer the question of how
to seek security both in the national and international field .
41 Bartlett, p . 673 .
42Leopold, p . 632; Dean, p. 101 . ; U. S. Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 , p . 1281 .
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The pr oblem of po,ver facto r s . -- In the days following San
Francis co, the dissent i ng votes of the major powers , primarily those
of the U. S . S . R. , have pr evented action i n the Security Council .

It

was hoped that this would not happen , but the facts belie the
princ i ple .
I t is not the fact t hat the vot ing problem itself is so
i mport ant, be c aus e the vote itself does not provide the real enforce ment .

It is the f a ct that the vote would s how whether r eal unanimity

coul d be a chi e ved .

Wi t h or without the vot e , unle s s the b i g powers

could agr ee on mat te rs affe cting the ir vit al i nt e res ts , the re would be
no peace and s e curity .

I t is not, the r e fore, the veto i tsel f , but

t he powe r f a ctors involved i n t he us e of the veto whi ch has hamper ed
t he eff e ct i venes s of the United Nat ion s .
The gre at powe rs and unani mity . -- It would appear t hat the
great powers had fin ally r eached agr eement on the type of wo r ld or gani zation to be erect ed , an organi zation i n which the pr imary respons ibili ty
for the maintenance of world pe ace and s e curity depe nded upon t he
united action of t he gr e at powe rs who had been members of the Grand
Alliance during Worl d War II.

It r emained to be s een how t his pr in-

ciple of unanimity would bre ak down in the days f ollowing San
Francisco, be cause of irreconci l able differences bet ween t he Sovi et
Union and the United States .
Weakness of the unanimity principle . - - The small nations
realize d the preponderance of power lay with the bi g nations .

The

Security Council could never take action without this power at its
disposal, and the Coun cil could never come to any decision if an act
of aggression were committed by one of the big powers .

The Security
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Council would be unlikely to take any action against a small nation
enjoying the aid and assistance of one of the big powers.

All realized

that the General Assembly was a sounding board of no real authority.
And they all realized that it would be next to impossible to change
the Charter in any way, shape or form without the consent of the big
powers .
But all of these nations felt that no organization could be
made overnight.

They felt that international organization rather than

international anarchy contained the best hopes for peace and security,
even if it meant the delegation of some of their national authority
to that body .

If it were possible in the future that the great

powers really could establish a measure of security to the small nations,
the small nations would find that they had exchanged the fear of war
for the arts of peace, that they had exchanged a mere shadow of national sovereignty for the substance of security against aggression . 43

43Dean , p . 13 .

CHAPI'ER IV
THE GREEK CASE
Introduction
As has been suggested, it was not the failure of the voting
formula itself that caused the breakdown of the unanimity principle
which had been built up so carefully and arduously by the big powers
during the war years.

It was the problem of the power factors involved

that caused the breakdown in the years which followed the defeat of
Germany and Japan.
It was hoped that in the Security Council of the United
Nations the resolution of the power conflict between the two great
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, might come about .

A

careful study, however, of one case which the Security Council undertook to solve will shm• that Soviet Russia and American could not
meet with the principle of unanimity.

This Greek Case, in fact, will

show that there were irreconcilable differences between Soviet concepts
of security and American concepts of security which could not be resolved by any means at the disposal of the Security Council.
Historical Background of the Greek Case
Russian desire for influence in the Balkans . -- Historically,
the Russia of the Czars was always interested in obtaining hegemony
in the Balkan area to carry out two objectives .

The first objective

of Czarist Russia was to build a balance of power within the Balkan
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states to protect herself from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The

second objective was to gain an outlet from the Black Sea into the
Mediterranean.

The Soviet Union in the years before World War II

tried to monopolize the Balkans to build a balance of power against a
resurgent Germany .

The Soviet Union, also, was interested in

gaining control of the valuable oil fields in Rumania and the Near
East,l in cutting off the supply lines of the Western countries to
these areas, and extending the influence of the Soviet Union as far as
possible .
To accomplish these objectives, the Soviets attempted to
block Western moves in the Balkan area.

During World War II Soviet

leaders objected strenuously to the opening on the part of the West
of a second front in the Balkans . 2

To maintain the sphere of influ-

ence which U.s.s.R. had so carefully built up in the early days of
World War II and to keep British influence in the Balkans from expanding , an agreement was signed between Foreign Minister Molotov and
Foreign Secretary Eden in 1944 which divided the Balkans into two
spheres.

This agreement stated that the British were to have only

the control of Greece and the southern half of Yugoslavia. 3

After

the end of World War II, the Soviet leaders realized that this agreement did not fit in with their objectives.

The Russian leaders

decided, therefore, that the Molotov- Eden Agreement should be disregarded .

Seizing upon the excuse that the British were maintaining the

1Krout , p . 243.
2nmytryshyn, p. 240.
3stettinius, p . 11.

Greek monarchy over the strenuous objection of the Greek people, the
Soviets began to participate indirectly in the Greek problem by
causing partisans from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to enter
Greece and foment civil war. 4

The U. S . S.R. in 1946 also brought to

the attention of the Security Council the question of British intervention in Greece.5

By an analysis of these objectives and actions,

it can be seen that the Soviet Union was vitally interested in
breaking up the balance of power directed against her which had been
created in the

ear East by the Western powers.

British desires for control of Greece . -- British interests
in the Balkans were directly opposed to Soviet interests .

Historically,

Great Britain, prior to World War II, was interested in building a
balance of power in the Balkans to be directed not only against
Germany and her allies, but also against Soviet Russia.

Great Britain

also \vas interested in keeping her supply lines to the Near East open
and, consequently, wanted to keep the Soviet fleet out of the
Mediterranean .

It was for these purposes that the Molotov-Eden

Agreement of 1944 was agreed to by Churchill . 6

It was also for the

purpose of keeping the Soviet Union from extending her control into
Western Europe that Churchill had argued so vehemently for a Balkan
campai gn instituted by the West .

Great Britain was vitally interested

~readgold , p . 415 . ; Jados , p . 181 . ; Frank Smothers , William
H. McNeill, Repor t on Gree ce , (New York : Twentieth Century Fund ,
1948 )' p . 152 .
5Goodr i ch and Hambro , p . 59; Edward O' Ballance , The Gre ek
Civil War , 1944- 1942 (New York : Frederick A. Praege r , 1966) , p . 211 .
6nmyt ryshyn , p . 240 .
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in maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans which Britain so
assiduously helped to build.
Post -Horld War II difficulties. -- In the early days follow·ing the end of World Vlar II the United States, Great Britain , and
the Soviet Union realized that the power situation was now completely
different from what it had been.

The British had lost their supremacy

in naval power and were searching about for some other means of protecting their supply lines.
The United States had come to realize, with the loss of
British sea power and protection for the \-/e stern hemisphere that the
United States supply lines both in the Atlantic and Pacific areas
were now threatened by Soviet expansionist tendencies and that
America's vital interests no longer lay just in the Vlestern hemisphere,
but had now become global in scope, and the Soviets were anxious to
exploit every Western weakness in order to promote Soviet interests.
These unsettled conditions in the world were focused in Greece
in 1946 and 1947.

The British were forced to admit they no longer

had the power capabilities to maintain their troops and navy in Greece
and asked the United States to replace them.7

This the United States

did in order to protect American supply lines in the Mediterranean and
Near East .

This was also done to prevent the Soviets from filling

the power vacuum left by the British in Greece .

It was Administration

thought, however, that both Greece and Turkey should contribute
something in order to keep the Soviets out of not only the Mediterranean,
but out of their countries as well .

7Jados, p . 192 .

The United States put forward the

58
Truman Doctrine to seek these ends . 8

The Soviets exploited British

and American weaknesses by indirectly fomenting civil war.
Action in the Security Council. -- The Greek Question was
first presented to the Security Council by the Soviet Union in a letter
dated January 21 , 1946, invoking Article 35 of the Charter and charging
that the presence of British troops in Greece was causing international
tensions which were detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security.

The matter, however, was declared closed by the Council after

a full discussion had taken place and after it was declared that the
Security Council had taken note of the views expressed . 9
On August 24 , 1946, the question again came before the Council
under Article 1 , Paragraph 2 and Article 35 , Paragraph 1 of the Charter
because of charges of the Ukraine government that British troops in
Greece were the primary cause of border violations and persecutions of
minority groups . 10
U. S .S . R. , 11

Several resolutions were brought forward, by the

by Belgium,12

of the dispute . l3

by Poland and others for pacific settlement

They all failed passage and the discussion was

again declared closed.

14

8Krout, p. 243 ; Ballance , pp. 141, 214 .
9Goodrich and Hambro, p . 59.
lOrbid . , p. 6o .
llsecurity Council Official Records (Lake Suc cess: United
Nations, 1946- -), First Year, Second Series, No . 13 , pp. 334- 335.
12 Ibid ., No . 16, p . 404 .
13rbid ., p . 415-417.
14 Goodrich and Hambro, p. 60 .
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Another solution under pacific settlement of disputes was
sought when the Greeks on December 3, 1946 , charged that Albania,
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia

t,.Jere

giving support to the Greek guerillas .

On December 19, 1946, an amended resolution of the United States to
establish a commission of investigation was approved with the Soviet
Union abstaining . 1 5

The Security Council began its consideration on

June 27 , 1947 , of the report of the commission, the majority of which
members said Albania , Bulgaria , and Yugoslavia were aiding the Greek
guerillas .
The majority of the commission stated also that the Security
Coun cil should re commend to the four states concerned that they take
such a ctions as deemed necessary to settle the dispute among themselve s in a peaceful manner . 1 6

A United States resolution incorporating

these re commendations was rejected because of a Russian veto . 1 7

A

Soviet r esolution in turn which put the blame on Greece and which
called fo r the end of fo r eign interventi on in Greece was rejected . 1 8
The Gr eeks then i nvoked Art i cle 39 of the Chart er , and the Australian
de le gat ion offe r ed a resolution whi ch placed the question under enforcement meas ures of the Charter .

This resolution and a subsequent

r e sol ution of the United States to the same effect was rejected by a
Soviet veto . 1 9
l 5securit y Council Offici al Re cords, Fi r st Year , Second
Seri e s, No . 28 , pp . 666- 691 .
16Ibi d ., No . 51 , pp . 1119- 1123 .
1 7Ibi d .,

o . 66 , pp . 1602- 1612 .

18Ibid ., No . 69 , pp . 1726- 1 730; Bal l ance , p . 191 .
1 9s e curity Counci l Offici al Re cords, Fi rst Ye ar , Second
Series, No. 79 , pp . 2093- 2099 .
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Attempts on the part of the United States to let the General
Assembly examine the question under the authority of Article 12 of the
Charter met with a Soviet use of the "double" veto .

The whole question

was finally taken off the agenda of the Security Council and given to
the General Assembly by means of a procedural vote. 2 0
Russian Methods of Seeking Objectives
No direct participation . -- By an examination of the official
records of the Security Council discussion of the Greek question, it
can be deduced what were the Soviet methods of achieving its objectives .

Although it was almost certain that the Soviet Union was the

instigator of the Albanian, Bulgarian , and Yugoslavian aid to the
Greek guerilla forces, the Soviet Union wisely kept from giving direct
aid to those guerilla forces so that the Soviet representatives in the
Security Council •rould be able to cast their votes under ''pacific
settlement of disputes" .

By not giving direct aid to the three Balkan

countries but by upholding their viewpoints in the Security Council,
the Soviet Union was able to indulge in a "war by proxy" to further her
national objectives .

The Soviet bloc also refused to participate in a

sub - committee to be established under the authority of the Security
Council .

For this sub-c ommittee, to the Soviet mind , would have kept

the Soviet bloc in the minority and would have allowed the AngloAmerican bloc to retain a foothold in Greece .

21

Jn addition it would

20 Goodrich and Hambro, p . 61; Ballance , p. 155 .
2lsecurity Council Official Records, Second Year , No . 58 ,
p . 1334 .
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have allowed the Anglo-American bloc to interfere in the affairs of
Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and thus expand the influence of
the Western bloc in the Balkans .

22

Backing of the Soviet Satellite countries in the United
rat ions .

The Soviet government backed completely the position taken

by Albania, Bulgaria , and Yugoslavia for it was through these countries
that the Soviets sought their objectives.

Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet

representative, in a speech on September 26, 1946, said that the
setting up of a commission of investigations as sought by the United
States delegation would throw the guilt on Albania, Bulgaria, and
2
Yugoslavia, thereby absolving the foreign interventionists in Greece . 3
In another speech Gromyko said that the Western powers'
attempt to throw the blame on Albania , Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia was
an attempt to divert the attention of the Security Council to those
questions which were non-existent .

He continued by saying that the

United States was seeking any method available in order to gain control
of the rivers, oil fields, and fertile lands of the three Balkan
countries under United States attack . 24

The Russian delegate, in

another series of discussions on the same problem, said that the
British did not want a full investigation in the Council, with Albanian,
Bulgarian , and Yugoslavian representatives participating, because such
an investigation would prove that the British were covering up their
activities in Greece .

The investigation would prove that the Brit ish

were misusing the Security Council for their own interests and would
22 Ibid .,

o . 59 , pp . 1346- 1356 .

23Ibid . , First Year, Second Series, No . 16, pp . 396- 398 .
24 Ibid ., p . 382 .
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also prove that the Albanians, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavs were correct
in their charges that Greece, aided and abetted by the British and
Americans, was the nation which had caused the trouble in the Balkans . 2 5
The Soviet resolution of September 16, contained all the
accusations and demands which the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav
representatives had put be fore the Council . 26

This resolution said

that monarchist elements in Greece were the cause of all the trouble
for it was only these elements, in control of the Greek government,
which were seeking to annex certain territories of her neighbors, which
were persecuting certain minority ethic groups , and which were seeking
to bring about armed conflict between Greece and Albania .

This Russian

resolution, as did the statements of the three northern neighbors of
Greece, called upon Greece to put an end to border activities and to
terminate the persecution of national minorities .

The resolution also

called upon the Security Council to keep the whole question on its
agenda if the Greek government did not comply with the above recommendations.
Use of the Security Council as a propaganda device . -Art hur Hays Sulzberger, the editor of the Ne\.;r York Times , said, in
regard to the question of the pacific settlement of the Greek question
in the summer of 1946, that the whole plan of organization on the part
of the Soviet bloc was to produce sufficient chaos in Greece , so that
British and world public opinion would demand the withdrawal of
British troops .
2 5Ibid . ,

o. 6, pp . 151-156.

26Ibid . , No . 13, pp . 334-335 .
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This would produce a temporary postponement of the elections
in Greece in order to strengthen the Leftist forces . 27

To put this

statement in broader terms, the Russians were using the Security Council as a propaganda device for two effects :

(1) use the sovereignty

principle to gain the support of the small nations, (2) to bring about
a "fait accompli" by delaying tactics.

Statements made in the Security

Council point up this fact that the Russians were using the Security
Council as a propaganda device .

The British delegate , Cadogan, on

September 5, 1946, referred to the Ukrainian charges and called them
nothing but propaganda tactics to gain the support of the smaller
countries vrhich might be taken in by such propaganda.

He went on to

say:
So here you have it! His Majesty 's Government in the
United Kingdom is responsible not only for all that may
have gone wrong in Greece, it is responsible for the oppression of minorities , it is inciting Greece to attack her
much more powerful neighbors, it has just faked a plebiscite .
It has violated the Charter of the U~ited Nations . This
is Mr . Manuilsky 's original charge . 2
In order to prove, however , to the small nations that Britain
and America were imperialist nations, Gromyko continually repeated
the charge that foreign interventionists in Greece were causing the
Greek people to live under an unpopular regime, and that these foreign
interventionists were causing the Greek government to undertake actions
which violated the sovereignty of her neighbors.

29

This argument

27Ibid ., No . 9 , p . 230 , quoting Arthur Hays Sulzberger, New
York Times , July 26 , 1946.
28 Ibid., No . 9 , p . 243 .
29Ibid ., No . 28, pp . 639- 647.
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was also used by the Yugoslav representative,30 the Albanian representative,31 and the Bulgarian representatives . 32

Even as far along

as August, 1947, Gromyko claimed that foreign troops and foreign aid
for Greece was nothing but a form of enslavement, and the fact that
this aid was requested by the Greek leaders was only proof that the
Greek leaders were willing
to sacrifice Greek independence and national sovereignty
in order to maintain in Greece a regime which is not ~opu
11
lar and vrhich is not supported by the Greek people . 3
11

Although the Soviet Union had maintained from the beginning
that it did not desire to have the smaller nations have any voice in
the world organization, the sovereign equality principle was used by
the Soviet bloc in another manner to gain the support of the small
nations .

vfuen the Soviet and Polish delegates asked that Albania,

Bulgaria , and Yugoslavia be permitted to join the commission which was
to be established by the Council in December of 1946,3 4 these delegates
were, in effect , promising the small nations that, in any such future
commissions to be established, the Soviet bloc would see to it that the
small nations would be able to protect their interests to a certain
degree .
vfuen the Commission reported to the Security Council in
June of 1947, however, the Soviet bloc no longer maintained this
30ibid ., pp . 661- 662 .
3libid . , No . 51 , pp . 1129- 1143 .
32 Ibid ., No . 28, pp . 661 - 662 .
33 Ibid ., Second Year , 1o . 69, pp . 1719- 1720 .

3 4 ~. , First Year , Second Series , No . 28, pp . 652- 653 .
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position.

They now maintained that any such investi gatory commission

violated national sovereignty.

One argument used in this Greek question

was that a majority vote in any such commission would not guarantee
just conclusions because the underlying purpose of any such commission,
as proved in the Commission of Investigation in the Greek question,
would be to keep up foreign interference or intervention by the Hestern
pm·rers in any such country investi gated.

These Western poi.rers, the

Soviets claimed, would know in advance that there would be no objectivity in any such commission, because the Soviet bloc which was seeking
to protect the soverei gnty of all nations would ahrays be in the
minority. 35
Both Russia and her partner, Poland, claimed that any such
commission as proposed by the Americans for the pacific settlement of
disputes in the Greek case which allowed that commission to deci de
which acts were threats to the peace •rould throw the blar.1e equally
on Albania, Bulgaria , and Yugoslavia and would, in effect, place all
four of the Balkan countries under a United Nations trusteeship
dominated by the Anglo- American bloc.

No self-respecting soverei n

nation could allow such blame to be placed on its shoulders no could it
allow the establishment of such a trusteeship . 36

The Soviet delegate

further maintained that, because Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia did
not belong to the International Refugee Organization, any attempt to have
that body take charge of refugees in those three countries would be in

35Ibid ., Second Year, No . 76, pp. 1975-1977 .
36Ibid ., No . 59, pp . 1354-1356 .
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violation of national sovereignty.

Such an arrangement in any small

country, the Soviet delegate maintained, would be just another form of
trusteeship under domination of the Anglo- American bloc . 37
With arguments such as these being presented by the Soviet
bloc delegates, it can be seen that the Soviet concept of the sovereignty principle was that this principle should be used to protect
not only the Soviet Union but also the Soviet Union satellites from
penetration by Vlestern ideas and Western force .
The Soviet delegate also stated that, although the Security
Council did have the right to inquire into facts connected with a
certain dispute or situation and to conduct an investigation in regard to that dispute, all decisions under Chapter VI of the Charter
dealing with pacific settlement including the right of conducting an
investigation was only recommendatory.

No country, as a result, had

the legal obligation to allow an investigation to be conducted on its
.
38 as such an investigation would be contrary to the
own terr1tory,
domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter .
The Soviets even used this principle of the sovereign right
of nations when confronted with the fact that they had not participated in the four - power commission to supervise the Greek elections .
By not participating they could claim that the small percentage of
votes cast for Leftist candidates would prove that the Anglo-American
bloc had "faked11 the elections. 39

Manuilsky, the Ukrainian delegate ,

37~., No . 76, PP · 1970-1977.

38 Ibi d ., No . 64 , PP· 1541-1542 .
39Ibid ., First Year , Second Series, No . 9 , PP · 216- 222 .
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said that the reason for Soviet non-participation in the commission
was because the U.S . S .R.
"regarded the establishment of such tutelage over G~ ece
0
. . . as an intervention in the affairs of Greece."
With all these arguments in favor of national sovereignty,
with all the long speeches directed against American and British imperialism, and by the use of the veto, the Russians hoped to bring
about a "fait accompli" which would see them in a position of dominance
in Greece .

Gromyko pointed this out in a speech to the Security

Council on July 15, 1947, although he made the point in a rather backhanded way.

He said he did not believe the discussion on the Greek

question should be speeded up, even although the Greek representative
was claiming new disturbances along Greece's northern border.

The

claiming of these new disturbances was only for the purpose of having
the resolutions of the Anglo-American bloc put into force as soon as
possible by the Security Counci1 .

41

Use of the veto . -- Speaking on the veto in connection with
the Greek case, Gromyko said :
The U. S.S . R. does not consider itself bound to agree
on proposals on the Greek or any other question which, in
the opinion of the government of U. S . S . R., are not in conformity with the interests of the maintenance of peace and
the development of friendly relations between States, more
especially if their ac~~ptance might only le ad to still
greater complications .
The Russians were not eager to have commissions of investi gation in the Balkans for the purpose of solving the Greek question .
40 rbid ., No . 11 , p . 291 .
4lrbid ., Second Year , No . 58, pp . 1337- 1338 .
42rbid ., No . 76 , p . 1975 .
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The Soviets did not \·rant to see the Security Council impose any enfo rcement measures detrimental to their interests in the Balkans .
This is vrhy the Soviet Union used the "absolute protecti ve

11

veto in

connection with the United States and Australian resolutions which
vrould have imposed such measures .

If one remembers that the Soviet

Union 1 s concept of a world organization did not include the smaller
nations 1 having a voice in the organization, it is not hard to see
vrhy the Soviet Union in the Security Council made use of the "double"
veto in connection vrith the United States proposal to turn the Greek
question over to the General Assembly under authority of Article 12
of the Charter.
Bilateral agreements -- The Soviet Union, always fearful
that the United

I

ations vrould take action contrary to Soviet policy

in respect to Greece and the Balkans, propounded that the only way
to solve the whole question would be through bilateral agreements
worked out independently by Greece and each of her northern neighbors.
Such a solution would settle these differences on a one to one basis.43
Such a solution, hm-rever, vrould successfully drive out British
and American influences in Greece .

Such a solution would also enable the

three northern countries of Greece to exert direct pressure on that
country and would enable Russia, through her control of the three
satellite countries, to exert indirect pressure on Greece.

By such

direct and indirect pressures, the Soviet Union hoped to force Greece
under Soviet control .

The Polish resolution of August 6, 1947, which

43 Ibid . , pp . 1968- 1974 .

69
would have caused the Greek government to make such bilateral agreements was, however, voted down.44

American Methods of Seeking Objectives
Direct participation. -- Directly opposed to the Soviet
method of non-participation in the affairs of Greece were the American and British methods of maintaining their influence and retaining
the balance of power.

United States officials never denied the fact

that money, arms, and military missions were being sent to Greece
to prevent the Leftist guerillas from seizing control of the Greek
government .

The purpose behind the Truman Doctrine as stated to the

American Congress was that the United States could not
"allow changes in the status quo . . • by such methods as
coercion, Qr by any such subterfuges as political infiltration." 4 5
The British, too, never denied that they had their troops in Greece
for the purpose of protecting British interests, but they did deny
that the maintenance of such troops was in violation of the United
Nations Charter .

Cadogan, in a speech to the Security Council on

September 25, 1946, pointed this out when he said:
"It (The Charter) does not say that no Member of the United
Nations may maintain troops in the territory of another
Member at the request of the latter . "
He continued by saying that the Charter only forbade the United

ations

as an independent body from interfering in the domestic affairs of a
member state . 46
44Ibid ., No . 71, p . 1800 .
4

5u .s. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington :
Government Printing Office, May 4, 1947) , Supplement .

U.S.

46Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second
Series , No . 9, p . 247 .
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The fact that the United States and Great Britain ,.,ere vi tally interested in a four-power commission to watch over the Greek elections of
1946 , also shows that these two countries were guarding their own
interests and were not willing to see the Greek forces of the Left win
the elections by political machination.
The Soviets were correct in their

viev~oint

that the British

and Americans were seeking to continue their influence in Greek affairs through United Nati ons commi ssions.

The Britis h and Americans

knew quite well that their views would prevail on any one of these
commissions.

For all the talk of having a committee of three or five

selected on the basis of impartiality 47 or a commission composed of all
the members of the Security Council, and not just a commission of a
group of nations,

48

the Americans and the British knew, by the very

organization of the United Nations, that their viewpoints would be the
.1.~ng

preva~

.

. t . 49

v~ewpo~n

Gain support of small nations. -- In reply to a charge by
Manuilsky, the Ukrainian delegate, that a wall of votes was being organized against U. S . S . R. , Van Kleffens, the I etherlands representative,
said:
I hold the view that nobody has the right, if a vote
threatens to go against him, to attribute sinister motives
to people who have no sinister motives at all .
50
4

7Ibid . , No . 16 , pp . 394-396 .

48 rbid ., Second Year, No . 58, pp . 1328-1329.
4

9Norman J . Padelford, ed . Current Readin s on International
Relations (Cambridge : Addison- 1vesley Press, 1947-- ), No . 3 January,
1948 ) , p . 133 , quoting Thomas J . Hamilton , "The United Nations at
World, Yale Review , Autumn , 1947 .
5°secur ity Council Official Records, First Year , Second Series,
No . 13 , p . 325 .
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It was the method of the United States to have such small
countries as the Hetherlands agree that their interests were the same
as those of the United Stat es , that the United States was protecting
those interests, and that the United States had no sinister motives in
that protection.

vfuen the Council was called upon to decide whether

to allow the Albanian and Bul garian representatives to argue their
case before the Council, the Uni ted States delegate said
• the Security Council should abide by the spirit
of the Charter and grant the opportunity to be heard
to the States concerned.51
In the discussion on the report of the Commission of Investigation , the United States delegate said that the Security Council
had no ri ghts to decide , as was desired by the Soviet bloc, to interfere
in the internal affairs of Greece except insofar as those affairs
might be contributing to the s ituation along Greece's northern bound ary.

52
The United States stand that the investi gation commi ttee had

made the correct recommendations was upheld by the Brazilian delegate
for he felt that even if the commission had used the wrong proce dur e ,
in bringing out the facts , the wrong procedures could i n no way affect
the conviction that a serious situation existed in northern Greece.5 3
The United States delegate also maintained throughout the
discussions that such situations which could be deemed dangerous
should be taken care of immediately. 54

If the power problem could not

5libid., No. 10, pp . 266-267.
52Ibid, Second Year, No. 54, pp . 1204-1209.
53~., p . 1211.

54Ibid., No . 15, p . 387.
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be resolved among the big powers in the Security Council, then the
small nations of the General Assembly should be given the opportunity
of making recommendations.
Not only did the United States wish to shmr the small nations
that the United States was interested in a fair hearing for all and
was interested in protecting the sovereignty of other countries, but
the United States, also, wanted to show the small nations that indirect Soviet domination of Greece meant a loss of soverei nty for that
country .
For this reason, Warren Austin, the United States delegate,
claimed that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia , acting under Soviet guidance , had no intention of settling their dispute by peaceful means nor
did they wish to develop friendly relations with that country nor were
they interested in the sovereign equality of Greece.

Yugoslavia had vio-

lated Article 1 of the Charter, and Albania and Bulgaria had violated
Article 2, Paragraph 6 of the Charter . 55

For these reasons, the United

States delegate on August 4, 1947, voted against the Soviet resolution
which would have branded Greece the aggressor nation and would have established a commission to see to it that the people of Greece, and not
6
the Greek government , were the recipients of foreign aid . 5
Use of the United Nations to gain moral backing for
policies . -- Coupled with the method of gaining support of the smaller
nations by pointing out that the United States was interested in a fair
55security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series ,
No . 51 , pp . 1120-1121 .
56 security Council Official Records , Second Year, No . 69,
PP · 1726-1730 .
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hearing for all countries, and interested in the protection of the
soverei gn rights of all nations, and that Sovi et attempts to indirectly
control Gre ece meant a loss of sovereignty for that country, was the
method of using the United 1 at ions to gain moral backing for United
States policies.
To gain the support of the majority of the small nations and
to gain the moral backing that such a majority carried with it, the
United States was required to do three things .

First of all , the

United States was required to word proposals so that the small nations
could adhere to them .

In the de fense of his government ' s proposal of

December 18, 1946, Herschel Johnson , the United States delegate,
declared :
It seems to me to be the inescapable and self-evident
duty of the Security Council to investigat e the facts pertaining to these border violations without attempting at
this time , on the basis of present information, to pr ejudge
the issues . For this reason my Government has instructed
me to propose the setting up 9f a commission of inve stigation
to asce r tain the facts . . . 5
The res olution itself vas •rorded so as to appear that the
United Nations and the Security Council were gaining full control of
the situation .

The commission was able to investigate in all areas

con cerned , and yet the sovereignty of nations would be protected by
having the Secretary-General of the United Nations make all arrangements of entry into certain countries . 5 8

The wording of the United

State s proposal of June 27 , 1947 , 59 as amended by various small
57Ibid . , First Year , Second Series, No . 27, pp . 629- 631 .
58 Ibid .
59Ibid ., No . 51 , pp . 1124- 1126.
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powers, contained the substance of the recommendations as proposed by
the majority of the investigating committee.

This resolution, be-

cause of that wording, was subscribed to by nine out of eleven members
of the Council on July 29, 1947.
by use of a veto.60

The Soviet Union blocked its passage

Even the resolution of September 15, 1947, was

worded to show the small nations and the people of the world that the
United States was interested in having a solution worked out by the
United Nations in the General Assembly if necessary.6l
If the United States method was to gain the support of the
smaller nations and gain the moral backing of the United Nations in
support of United States policies, it follows that such a method would
necessarily call for Soviet vetoes on American proposals .
As was stated by the Ukrainian delegate at the outset of the
discussion, a wall of votes was being organized against the U.S . S . R. by
the Anglo-American bloc .

The Polish delegate also referred to this

problem on August 19, 1947:
We must decide whether we really want to reach such
a solution, or whether the aim of the Council is merely to
cause more vetoes from one side to another.
I understand that for some reasons a veto may be very
useful for certain Member States. However, purposely to
cause a veto to be used by submitting new resolutions which
we know beforehand serves neither the authorit~ 2nor the dignity
of the Council, nor indeed the cause of peace .
Forcing the Soviets to use the veto even in the face of a
majority vot e was just another method of the United States to prove
60 Ibid .,

o. 66, pp. 1602- 1612 .

61Ibid ., No . 89 , p . 2369 .
6 2security Council Official Records, Second Year Series ,
o . 58, p . 132 .
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to the smaller nations that Soviet interests were not those of the
smaller nations.
Small povrers as Conciliators
Although the small powers found that they could agree more
readily with the United States proposals than with the proposals of
the Soviet bloc, these smaller povrers vrere not willing to support the
United States proposals in order to condemn the Soviet bloc.

The

small nations' position was stated very clearly by the Columbian representative in the Security Council:
We cannot help saying that it has given us great
concern to see that they (the United States and U. S . S . R.)
are conflicting to a degree that seems to rule out any
attempt by the representatives gf the small nations
to approach the Greek question. 3
The Australian delegate said he did not want to see the
Security Council become a place where opposition between the Great
Powers is accentuated . 64

The Columbian representative speaking in

behalf of the small nations believed that the Security Council should
not seek to impose a settlement which would increase the tension
between the East and West.

The Council should act as a conciliator

and suggest ways and means of working out their difficulties by themselves.

To this end a commission of good offices and conciliation with

headquarters in a neutral country would be established for the disputants to work out their differences . 65

b3Ibid ., No . 5U, p . 1321.
b4Ibid., First Year, Second Series, No . 13, pp . 329-333.
b)Ibid ., Second Year, No . 58, pp . l3cc-l3c5 .
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In further discussion, the smaller nations came to the conelusion that diplomatic relations between all four countries should be
established, before any attempts at good-neighborliness could be
made.

66 The Greek question was not resolved in the Security Council

nor the United Nations, even with the small powers' action as conciliators, because of the East-West power factors involved.
The problem was, therefore, turned over to the General Assembly .

It is not within the scope of this paper to study the

resolution of the Greek question within the General Assembly, but note
should be taken of the fact that the Assembly did, through its broad
powers of recommendation and investigation, call upon the parties
directly concerned to settle their dispute peacefully and make
recommendations looking to the establishment of normal relations
between these parties .

The General Assembly also established a Special

Committee to aid in carrying out the above recommendations.

The Soviet

bloc announced its non-cooperation with this committee and by its
action seriously hampered the effectiveness of the committee .

It was

not until Yugoslavia broke away from the Cominform that a measure of
peace was restored to Greece.
General Conclusions
General Soviet objectives . - - This study of the Greek question
will show the global objectives of both the Soviet Union and the United
States .

The Soviets, by their proposals, vetoes, and propaganda in

the Security Council, showed that they were interested only in using

66

!bid . , No . 63, pp . 1479- 1489.
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the United

ations to further their national objectives .

By the use of

such methods, they sought to expand the influence of the Soviet Union
and Communism not only in Greece and the Balkan area, but throughout
the world.
By using the principle of sovereign equality the Soviets were
attempting to wean the smaller nations away from the Anglo-American
sphere of influence and have these nations enter the Soviet sphere .
By the use of the sovereignty principle, the Soviets sought to prevent
other nations and organs of the United Nations from entering the AngloAmerican sphere of influence as well .

By recommending bi - lateral

agreements as a solution for disputes, the Soviets further sought to
drive out American and British influence in the smaller countries while
bringing these smaller countries into the Soviet sphere .

With the use

of bi-lateral agreements and by the support of nations such as Albania,
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, the Soviets were seeking to create a balance
of power or a security belt for themselves outside the United r ations
framework .
General American objectives . - - With the Greek question again
as a frame of reference, America's global objectives can be seen .

By

attempting to show that the smaller nations ' interests were the same as
thos e of the United States , by attempting to show the smaller nations
that Soviet domination meant a loss of sovereignty, by attempting to
gain moral backing for United States policies , and by participating
directly in the United Nations, the United States was seeking to retain
the balance of power once directed against Hitler and now directed
against the U. S . S . R.

By the use of such methods , America was also

seeking to protect herself and the Western hemisphere from attack .
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The methods outlined above would, United States leaders felt, bring
about this protection .
Inability of the United

ations to act as an independent

agen~. - -The Greek case , however, shows most clearly that the United

Nations cannot act as an independent agent to settle disputes if two
great powers are in fundamental disagreement .

The United Nations can

only act if those nations are willing to delegate supreme authority to
the United Nations .

Because each nation is continually seeking more

power in the maintenance of its vital inter ests , nations are not willing
to delegat e supr eme authority to an inter national body .

Because of this

di l emma and because the United Nations had been launched in an alr eady
polari zed world , 67 the United Nati ons has been unable to t ake inde pendent act ion i n import ant cases .
Furthermore , basic differences in philosophy and disagreeme nts on objectives in the field of collective security between the
U. S . S . R. and the United State s render action on the part of the United
68
Nations i mposs i ble when thes e two count r ie s are oppos ing each other .
The Unit ed State s seeks a preservat i on of the st at us quo in mat ters of
6
s e curit y, while t he U. S . S . R. is cons is tently s eeki ng a r evision . 9
But i n the United Nat i ons the Unit ed Stat e s has favore d a "loose
construction" of the Charte r i n f urt he r ance of its own secur ity , while
6 7Edward Buehring , "The United States, The United Nations, and
Bi-Polar Politics", I ntern ational Organization, IV, 4 (November, 195 0),
p . 576 .
68Jos eph E . Johnson, "The Sovi et Union, The Unite d States and
International Security", International Organization, I I I , l (February ,
1949 ) ' p . 7.
6 9Ibid ., p . 2 .
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the Soviet Union has insisted on a "strict construction" in furtherance
of its security . 7°

While both nations gain from membership in the

United Nations, the United Nations, because of these basic differences
in concepts and attitudes, becomes only another arena where power politics are played .

The very fact that both the Soviet Union and the

United States are permanent members of the Security Council shows that
power politics cannot be contained within the limits of the Charter . 7 1
It can also be seen from the Greek case that the United Nations
is not equipped to take action in an international civil war, and it
is not equipped to take action if one great power is backing a smaller
nation in any dispute .

The great powers are not willin

to delegate

supr eme authority to settle disputes to an international body.

Such

a delegation of authority might be detrimental to national interests
and might mean the abandonment of basic concepts of belief .

7°rbid ., p . 11
71Buehring , P . 581 .

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS I

REGARD TO SECURITY AND
UNANIMITY

Soviet Security Objectives
The conclusions from this analysis of security concepts in
regard to unanimity are rather easy to discern.

The Soviet leaders

feel that security can be best achieved by an expansion of both the
Soviet Union and Communism.

Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate to

the United Nations, made this statement regarding Soviet policy:
Soviet policy is based on entirely different
principles, on basically new principles . Its main
function is to secure peace for the peoples of the
Soviet land, and to create external political conditions which are necessary for their peaceful,
creative work.l
Stalin himself had said that the Russian revolution resulted
in the establishment of the "first proletarian dictatorship" which
was to be "a powerful and open base for the world revolutionary movement. " 2

The Soviet leaders realized that this Soviet expansion could

not come about through peaceful means 3 alone and that wars to attain
this expansion, therefore, were not to be considered as

unjust~

can be

1 security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, No. 32, p . 3 .
2 Ibid ., No . 31 , pp. 22-23, quoting Stalin, On the Problems
of Leninism:-fl928)
3Ibid.

4Ibid . , quoting Short History of the Communist Party .
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found in the various writings of the Soviet leaders, in the writings
published under Soviet government auspices,5 and in the writings of
various students of International Russian policy. 6

The Soviets are

strict adherents to the idea that
he who rules East Europe commands the Heartland , he who
rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, and he who
rules the World-Island rules the World.7
Such statements are borne out by Soviet action.

The Soviet

government seeks to expand the influence of Russia and Communism in
several ways.

The Soviets expand their influence by giving economic,

military and moral support to those underdeveloped nations and groups
which are willing to spread Communist doctrine.

The setting up of

the Comintern, Cominform, and the backing of Albanian, Bulgarian, and
Yugoslavian guerillas in Greece are but three examples of how the
Soviet Union, by supporting nations and groups within its sphere of
influence, 8 seeks to expand.

The Soviet Union also seeks to expand

by bringing the smaller nations within the Soviet sphere of influence,
by claiming that the Soviet Union is vitally interested in the protection of national sovereignty, and by claiming that the Anglo-Americans

5Ibid . , quoting Bolshevik .
6Historiaus", "Stalin on Revolution", Foreign Affairs, XXVII
(January, 1949), pp. 175-214. See also Mintauts Chakste, "Soviet
Concepts of the State, International Law and Sovereignty", AJIL
(January, 1949)
7Bemis, p . 463, quoting H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals
and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York, 1919) .

~he Korean affair showed how the U. S . S . R. militarily supported its satellite neighbors and how the U. S . S . R. gave political and
moral support to those nations in the United Nations .

--------
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are an imperialist bloc.

The proposals of the Soviet government in

the thirties for total disarmament and the proposal of the Soviet
government to prohibit the use of atomic weapons are other examples o
how the U.S.S . R. hopes to gain the support of the smaller nations.
Concurrent with the objectives of the Soviet government to
expand the influence of the U.S.S.R. and Communism for security reasons
is the objective of protecting Russian sovereignty from outside interference and influence.

Soviet demands for unanimity among the bi g

powers in the Security Council shows how Russia sought to prevent the
smaller nations from taking any action detrimental to Soviet soverei gnty and security.

This unanimity principle, carrying with it the ri ght

of veto, could also prevent any other bi g power or combination of
powers within the Security Council from making any decision or taking
any action deterimental to Soviet security .
The policies of expanding Soviet-Communism while preventing
other nations from entering the Soviet sphere of influence were combined
in Russian attempts to build various balances of pmrer .

The proposals

of the Soviet government for total disarmament would have enabled the
U. S . S.R . to build a favorable balance of power in the economic and
political fields while preventing other nations from using armed force
to enter the Soviet sphere.

Soviet action in the League was aimed

primarily against a Germany threatening Soviet security .
Soviet use of the absolute unanimity principle in the League ,
was a means of preventing any League action detrimental to Soviet vital
interests .

When the attempt to use the League failed the U. S . S . R.

sought its objectives of expansion without retaliation by other means .

----- ~---
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The taking of territory from Finland, the absorption of the Baltic
states, and the division of Poland with Germany were all for the
purpose of expanding Great Russian Chauvinism.
During and after the defeat of Germany, the Soviet Union insisted on unanimity among the big powers as a balance against a
resurgence of power on the part of her enemy.

Unanimity also prevented

decisions and actions detrimental to Soviet vital interests from
being taken by the Security Council in the United Nations.

The Soviet

Union, however, did not rely on the unanimity principle alone to
protect its vital interests .

With the creation of the various

"People's Republics", with the retention of Soviet armed force,
and by fomenting civil wars throughout the world the Soviet Union has
sought to build balances of power which would allow her to expand
while protecting the Soviet sphere from ideas, influences, and
armed forces detrimental to Soviet sovereignty and security.
The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union for total disarmament of conventional weapons and the prohibition of the atomic
bomb are examples of how the Soviet Union sought to gain equality in
the military field while gaining superiority in the economic field.
The Soviet demand for the retention of the unanimity principle also
shows how that country protects its sovere i gnty by preventing discussion, investigation, and enforcement in the Security Council on
matters which might jeopardize Soviet security .

The gaining of

equality in some fields while gaining superiority in others is a
planned policy , and not just happenstance, on the part of the Soviet
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government.

This can be seen by examining statements made by Soviet

leaders ana their spokesmen.9
Soviet actions in the United

ations have shown that the

U.S.S.R. wants the United Nations to be used as a balance against
resurgent enemy powers threatening Soviet security but it is unwilling
to allow the United

ations to become an anti-Soviet coalition.

Soviet actions in the United Nations also show that the U.S.S.R. is
attempting to break the balance of power held by the Western bloc,
and that the Soviet Union is attempting to convince not only the
people within its own orbit, but others that the U.S.S.R. is not an
aggressor nation.

Thus the unanimity principle has become for the

Russians yet another means of seeking objectives of expansion of
the Soviet sphere of influence.

The Soviets are also interested in

retaining the unanimity of the Big Four for this means the retention
of the veto.

With the use of the veto, the Soviets can prevent any

action which might jeopardize Soviet policy and vital interests at
any time .
American Security Objectives
Although the United States has no such doctrinaire principles
or statements on which to base foreign policy, this analysis of the
development and subsequent breakdown of the unanimity principle leads
to several conclusions concerning American foreign policy.

The primary

purpose of American foreign policy is to protect the United States.
One objective, therefore, of American policy is to halt any moves
threatening American supply lines .

The Lend-Lease program, the Anglo-

9

Security Council , Official Records , Fifth year, No . 31,

pp. 22- 23 .

------------ --------

British "alliance" of 1941, the declaration of war against Germany
were all designed to protect the supply lines of America in the North
Atlantic.

Present United States adherence to N.A.T.O. is for the

same purpose.

It was for the purpose of protecting American interests

in the Mediterranean and Near East that America extended aid to
Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine .
'l'o further protect America 's position, the American government has from its founding, sought to protect the Western hemisphere
from attack.

The Monroe Doctrine with all its corollaries was an

outgrowth of this objective.

The promulgation of the "Good Neighbor"

policy and the delineation of security zones around the Western hemisphere at the outset of World War II were just other aspects of
strengthening the Monroe Doctrine .

When the United States found

that it could not hope to protect the Western hemisphere with the
loss of British naval power, the United States entered into World
War II.
It was for the purpose of using a collectivity of nations
to protect the Western hemisphere and, in particular, the United States
that America has tried to block Communist expansionist moves throughout the world as was done in Greece . 10

It was to protect American

security by blocking Soviet expansionist moves that the Marshall
plan was engineered.
Present-day America has found it necessary to join in alli ances which will further protect American supply lines throughout the
world and which will further protect the Western hemisphere from
attack .

To protect the American supply lines in the North Atlantic
1 '{:And as is now being done in Vietnam ]
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area from German attack during World War II was one of the reasons
why the United States was willing to become a partner of the Grand
Alliance.
The United States, as did the U.S.S.R., had hoped that the
Grand Alliance and its continuation after the war in the Security
Council of the United Nations could be used as a balance of power
against a resurgent Germany.

It was for this purpose and for the

purpose of protecting American sovereignty that the United States
adhered to the unanimity principle.

When it became clear, however,

that Soviet actions inside and outside the United Nations threatened
American security, the United States began to build a balance of power
against the Soviet Union .

A military and economic balance of power

was created by the United States with the creation of the European
Recovery Program.

A balance was upheld in the Near East with the

granting of United States aid to Greece and Turkey.
A further attempt on the part of the United States to build
a balance of power within the framework of the United Nations occurs
as the United States attempts to show the smaller nations that their
interests are linked with those of the United States as the United
States attempts to build a solid bloc of world opinion against the
Soviet Union .
American actions in the United Nations show that America,
too, is not adverse to using the United Nations to gain national
objectives .

American peace and security can be promoted by gaining

- - ------
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world moral backing and thus creating a bloc against Soviet moves.ll
The United States, to further halt Russian expansionist moves threatening American security, has extenaed aid outside the framework of the
United lations to those countries which have been engaged in shooting
wars with countries or groups under Soviet domination.

Such was the

case when the United States acting under the •rruman Doctrine sent
arms and military missions to Greece, Korea, and now Vietnam .

The

United States has, with the approval of the majority of Security
Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, sent arms and
troops to countries which are engaged in halting the expansion of
Soviet satellites. 12
It becomes clear, therefore, that if American concepts of
security coincide with Soviet concepts of security the unanimity
principle will be adhered to by the United States.

If American

security, however, becomes endangered by Soviet action, the United
States will seek to break loose from its adherence to the unanimity
11security Council, Official Records , Fifth Year, No . 17,
p . 12. Statement by Warren Austin in the Security Council in
regard to the Korean question, June 30, 1950:
and that, above everything else, the great
value of what we are witnessing and participating in
today is the moral power of united public opinion, and
that it may be strong enough to bring peace without
the shedding of more blood.
Also Ibid ., o . 39, p . 15 . Statement by Ernest Gross in the Security
Council in regard to the Korean question on September 7, 1950 .
1 2of ., New York Times, June 30, 1950, p . 1 . The statement
of Secretary of State Acheson in regard to American action in connection with the Security Council resolution of June 27 , 1950,
made it quite clear that United States action in support of the
authority of the United Nations was taken to support the existing
status quo in the Pacific area.

88
principle.

If American security interests are endangere d by constant

application of the veto, then American leaders are not adverse to
putting a limitation on that use.l3
The United States was able to get around Soviet use of the
"double" veto in the Greek case by sending that case to the General
Assembly by suggesting that the case be removed from the agenda of
the Security Council.l4

The very fact that the United States wanted

the General Assembly to discuss the matter shows that the United
States was trying to have the case settled to its advantage unhampered
by the Soviet use of the veto .
Conclusions in Regard to the Principle of Unanimity
History has shown that no important unanimous decisions
among all the members of the League were possible , for there were too
many fundamental conflicts and varieties of interests not only between
the smaller and larger powers , but among the great powers themselves .
It was thought that unanimity among the Big Four could be achieved
in the United Nations and so it might have been if there had been
another power endangering the security and sovereignty of the Big
Four.

But with the Big Four themselves in fundamental conflict, there

can be no unanimity and, subsequently , no action on the part of the
United

1
ations acting as an independent agent . 5

l3cf ., Inte r nat i onal Organization , V, l , 68. The Acheson
"Uniting for Peace" proposals are an attempt on the part of the United
States to limit the Russian use of the veto so as to enable the United
States to halt Communist expansion in the Pacific and in other areas
where such expansion might endanger United States supply lines and
security .
l4security Council, Official Records , First Year, Second
Series , No . 89 , p . 2404 .
l5Ibid ., Fifth Year , No . l5ff .
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Power politics played outside the United Nations of necessity
enters the United Nations, for each great power only seeks another
arena where it can expand its influence.

The Greek case points out

the fact that no enforcement action can be taken by the United Nations
in an international civil war, and no enforcement action can be taken
against a smaller nation if one of the great powers supports that
smaller nation.

In other words, the United Nations is incapable of

establishing a balance of power in favor of one group of nations or
another and is incapable itself of acting as a third force to settle
important differences among the big powers.
At the present time it does not seem likely that any international organization will be given supreme authority because the
great nations are not willing to place their security in the hands of
another body.

When these nations, that is, the United States and the

Soviet Union, are willing to delegate supreme authority to a world
organization, or are willing to forego the playing of power politics
in the international field, will there be any likelihood for peace,
security, and unanimity among nations.
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APPEr DIX

Statement of the American Position on Voting in the Security Council as
Read by Secretary of State Stettinius at the Third Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference 1
1.

Review of the Status of the Question
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would
remain under consultation for future settlement . Of these , the
princ i ple one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the
Securi ty Council .
At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegates tho r oughly explored the
whole question . Since that time the matter has received continued extensive study by each of the three governments .
On December 5, 1944 , the President sent to Marshal Stalin and
to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by
making Secti on C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals read as
foll ows:
11
C. Voting
1 . Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote .
2 . Dec i sion on pro cedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of seven members .
3 . Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members
including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VII , Section A
and unde r the se cond sentence of Paragr aph l of Chapter VII,
Sect i on C, a party t o a dispute shall abstain from voting .
2 . Analysis of t he Ame rican Propos al
( a ) We believe that our proposal i s ent i r ely consistent with
the spe cial r e spons ib i lities of the gr eat power s for the
pr e s e rvat ion of the peace of the world . In this respect
our pr opos al call s fo r the unqualified unanimity of the
per manent members of the Council on all maj or decisions
r e lating t o t he preservation of t he peace , in cluding all
mi litary and e nforcement measures .
(b) At t he s ame time our propos al r e cogn i zes the desirability
of t he per manent members f rankl y stating that the peaceful adj ustment of any controve rsy which may arise i s a
1 Edward R. Stet tinius, Roosevelt and t he Russians (New York :
Doubleday & Company, 1949 ), pp. 140- 143 ; U. S . Department of St ate ,
The Forei n Relations of the Uni t ed Stat es : The Confe rences at
Cairo and Tehran, 12 3, Washington D. C. , U. S . Government Printing
Office , 1961) , p. 735 .
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matter of general world interest in which any sovereign
member state should have the right to present its case .
We believe that, unless this freedom of discussion is
permitted in the Council, the establishment of a World
Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order
to save the world from a tragedy of another war would be
seriously jeopardized . Without full and free discussion
in the Council, the Organization , even if it could be
established, would be vastly different from the one we
have contemplated .
(c) Reasons for the American Position
From the point of view of the United States Government ,
there are two important elements in the matter of
voting procedure . First , there is the necessity for
unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world . Second , it is of particular importance to the people of the United States
that there be a provision for a fair hearing for all
members of the organization both large and small .
We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to
Marshall Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year
pr ovide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine
these t wo main considerations .
It is our earnest desire that our two great Allies will find
it possible to accept the President ' s proposals .
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